App. F. IX-4

Previous References. (1941-2 War) War File No. 91-41
Serial Nos. 1 to 16.

Later References.

GENERAL AND REVENUE SECRETARIAT.

Serial Nos. Sixteen only. P 116.

Part B for February - 1943.

SUBJECT.

Collection of information in regard to Jewish attacks and their effects.

M. Krishnan
22.2.43.

1343/W

Collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects.

General and Revenue Secretariat

W File No. 91 of 1941-2 [App. F. III—2

Serial No. 1

From

The Secy to the Hon'ble the Resident n. 3(15)-42/W dated 14th March 42 forwarding for information a copy of the Scheme drawn up by the Govt of India for the Collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects and requesting the Co-operation of this Govt in the Scheme.

with 24 copies of the Questionnaire

Copies of the Civil Defence Dept letters will be sent to the I.G.P. for information and necessary action. The Resty requests the Consent of this Govt to Co-operate fully in the Scheme. Submitted with a draft reply to the Resident for consideration. For perusal and orders.

For order if the enclosures to the Resident's letter may be communicated to the District Magistrates also.

Chief Secretary

Yes and the I.G.P. may be informed of this.

18/3

A copy of the questionnaire with Government Address Stamp [illegible] 18/3

3 copies of this with be required & send first by telephone or telegram

16.1.42 to D.M.s & Supdt. Railway letter. Early copies of Bengal letter of

20/3/42

21/3

NOTE—Contn. Sheet.

WD 04155—GPB—55,000—23-10-41

MAR 18 1942 9234

WAR OFFICE MAR 8058

16 MAR

1343/W. Collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects

File No. of 194 General and Revenue Secretariat.

Serial No.

In Para 5 of the letter the Resy requests the Consent of this Govt. Subd with a draft reply to the Resy and another draft to ~~with reference to the last letter~~ the D Ms. on the lines of the Law Ministers minute

Drafts may be approved

Sd/3

Sd/2

Sd/2

Issued 2194-2202 o 27th March 42 3.
to the Dists & Ags.

2203/W— to the IGP.

From The Secy to the Hon'ble the Resident 4.
F. 3 (15)-42/W dt 4th April 42 requesting that Town maps of certain towns

Subd for orders whether the D Ms concerned may be asked to send the plans or the Survey office may be asked. The maps have to be sent direct to the Govt of India with intimation to the Residency.

Sd/4

Subd with letters to the concerned A R P Controllers as directed.

Sd/-

Issued No. 2310-13/W dt 6.4.42 to the Concerned Officers.

5

1528/W. Collection of information in regard to hostile attacks & their effects.

General and Revenue Secretariat | W File No. 91 of 1941-2 | [App. F. III-2

Serial No.	From
6	The A.R.P Controller. Bhadravathi. 4942 of 7th April. 42 forwarding a Town Map of Bhadravathi.
7.	A.R.P Controller. Bangalore City A.R.P. 404/4142 of 7th April. 42 forwarding a map of Bangalore City area.
8	A.R.P Controller. Mysore City G.T. 2369 of 8th April. 42 - re Mysore City

Chief Secy's minute on the Mysore A.R.P Controller's letter O.B. Who ordered the field M.G.M

The Town maps of Bangalore. Mysore. Kolar & Bhadravathi were asked for from the respective A.R.P Controllers for transmission to the Govt of India. The K.G.F map has not been received so far. Perhaps the A.R.P Controller Mysore City may be asked to pay the bill out of the Contingencies placed at his disposal for A.R.P purposes. The other Controllers have not sent any bill as they were not asked to incur any bill.

Received

RS 9/4

The maps received are for information. A note regarding the cost of the maps of Mysore, the Residency may be obtained to enable it to be submitted to Govt.

9/4

The maps received may be sent in order to the Brig I Civil Defence Dept for the necessary information. After this, the file may be returned to us.

9/4

CHIEF SECRETARY 9. APR. 1942 GOVT OF MYSORE

NOTE—Cont. Sheet.

WDX4155—GPB—55,000—23-10-41

1487/W. Collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects.

File No. of 194 . General and Revenue Secretariat

Serial No. 9.

MAR 10 1942
No 1072

From The A.R.P Controller Kyf
D.O. no 2124 dt 8th April 42 forwarding the maps of the Kyf.

The Residency has requested that the Govt of India direct only the town maps of the places. Perhaps only the map of Kyf may be sent. Send with a draft letter to the Govt of India. The Residency will also be informed after issue of the letter to the Govt of India.

places below.

The 4 maps to be sent as placed below

(RS 10/4)

for favour of General submission

(Asst Secretary)

Issue 2396/W dt 11th April 42 to the Chief Dept - Dept 10.
Pol 1933 " to the Resy 11

1553/W. Collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects

General and Revenue Secretariat | W File No. 91 of 1941-2. | [App. F. III-2

APR 13 1942 No. 07861

Serial No. 12.

From The D M Kaiser

91 P.R. 796/41-42 d 9th April 42 requesting that 20 copies of the questionnaire may be sent for distribution among the Secretariat Officers.

Subd for perusal and orders whether the Reg may be asked to get from 200 copies of the Questionnaire for the use of this Govt

RS 11/4

There may be some information here [illegible] in the Circular [illegible]

11/4

Schwarz, AD

I agree with A. for orders

13/4

Market Search

Law Dept yes [illegible]

13/4

This is exhaustive. Need not in every case that every column will be answered

13/4

14/4

Subd with a letter to the Supdt Govt Printing to print & supply 500 copies

RS 14/4

14/4

13. Issued No. 2488/W dt 14.2.42 to the Supdt, Govt Printing

14. " WO 2793-201 dt 2/5/42 to D.G. Works etc to forward printed copies of questionnaire.

NOTE—Cont. Sheet

WD 04155—GPB—55,000—23-10-41

Collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects.

2224 W

Reports on Air Raid on Vizagapatam.

General and Revenue Secretariat — File No. — of 194 . — [App. F. III—2

Serial No.

From. The Secy to the Hon'ble the Resident
No F. 3 (15)-42/W dated 2nd June 42
forwarding Civil Defence Dept Circulars
dated 27th April & 9th May 42 regarding
Air Raids on Vizagapatam.

Subd for perusal. Printed copies of the
Questionnaire referred to are sent to the ISO & DMs only.
Copies of the enclosures will be sent to the ISO
for information. For orders whether copies may
be sent to the DMs also. Since the answers to the
Questionnaire will be a sample & guide to them.
if necessity arises for following up such reports

OFFICE OF THE MINISTER FOR LAW
JUN 4 1942
No. 12342

OFFICE OF THE MINISTER FOR LAW
JUN 12 1942
No. 12564

CHIEF SECRETARY 3 JUN 1942 GOVT OF MYSORE

CHIEF SECRETARY 8 JUN 1942 GOVT OF MYSORE

Copy of this may be sent to D.R.C
for information. Copies
of enclosures may be sent to D.M.P also.

Secy 7/6

Law Secy 4/6

From The Secy to the Hon'ble the Resident 5/6
F. 3(15)-42/W dated 5th June 42 forwarding copies of Civil
Defence Dept letters dated 22nd May 42.

Subd for perusal. Copies of the enclosures will also
be sent to the ISO & DMs with the previous Civil
Defence Dept letter.

WD 04155—GPB—55,000—23-10-41

Secy 7/6

Law Secy 13/6 Asst Secy 7/6

NOTE—Contn. sheet.

Collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects.

File No. 1343/W of 194 .

General and Revenue Secretariat.

Serial No.

Sumbd. with letter to I & P H Distt. Magistrates of Distts. with reptee. orders noted.

MB 1/7 see.

Issued Nos. 2-11/W dt 1.7.42 to the I.G.P. & the D.Ms of Distts.

✓

B

The reply to this communication should be addressed to the Secretary to the Resident in Mysore, Bangalore, by designation and not by name.

SECRET

No. 3(15)-42/W

1343/W

FROM

THE SECRETARY TO THE HON'BLE THE RESIDENT IN MYSORE.

To

The Chief Secretary to the Government of
His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore, Bangalore.

Dated Bangalore, the 14th March *194* 2.



Collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects.

- - -

SIR,

I am directed to forward herewith a copy of a letter from the Government of India, Civil Defence Department, No.390/41-A.R.P. (CD), dated the 19th February 1942 together with a copy of their letter No.390/41-A.R.P., dated the 31st December 1941 referred to therein. Copies of Training and Operations Circular No.11 referred to in paragraph 2 of the Government of India's letter dated the 19th February 1942 have already been forwarded to you.

2. The Government of India will be grateful if the Government of Mysore will kindly co-operate in the scheme drawn up by the Government of India for the collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects.

3. The intention is that the Immediate and Preliminary reports referred to in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Government of India's letter dated the 19th February 1942 should be sent by this Residency by code telegram, while the fuller report should follow by express letter as soon as the situation has been properly appreciated. On receipt of information from the Government of Mysore, the required reports will be drawn up by this Residency in consultation with local Military authorities.

4. 24 spare copies of the questionnaire referred to in paragraph 5 of the Government of India's letter are enclosed

for the use of the State Officers.

5. I am to request that, if there is no objection, the consent of the Government of Mysore to co-operate fully in the scheme may kindly be communicated to this Residency as soon as possible.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,

SECRETARY TO THE RESIDENT.

Copy of a letter from the Government of India, Civil Defence Department, to all Provincial Governments, and Chief Commissioners, No.390/41-A.R.P. (CD), dated the 19th February 1942.

----:0:----

I am directed to address you on the subject of reporting information regarding hostile attacks and their effects.

2.(i) The previous communications on this subject issued from this Department are letter No.390/41-A.R.P., of 31st December 1941, and Training & Operations Circular No.11, forwarded with letter No.78/242/41-A.R.P.II dated the 8th January 1942.

(ii) The former letter still stands as regards its general purport viz. that immediate telegraphic information should be sent of any incidents which are likely to become the subject of false and exaggerated reports but, as regards the details of information specially required paragraph 2 is amplified and superseded by the present letter.

(iii) Section A of Training & Operations Circular No.11 (Local Reports for action or information within the Civil Division or District) still stands but Section B (External reports to the Provincial Government and the Government of India) is superseded by the present letter.

3.(i) In order to lessen the congestion of communications and the burden on Provincial Governments/etc. and on Military Authorities it has been decided that the calling for and collecting of information regarding enemy action will be centralized in the Defence Department, as regards military information, and in the Civil Defence Department as regards civil information and that these two Departments will pass on to all other Departments and Provincial Governments/etc. such of the information as concerns them.

(ii) The only exception to this will be in the case of reports of working breakdown or of damage requiring instant departmental action such as interruption of communications e.g. Posts, Telegraphs, Railway, Ports and Civil Aviation. In these cases, reports strictly confined to the actual breakdown of working or to damage done and to the measures required to restore the situation may be submitted direct to the Director General, Posts and Telegraphs, the Railway Board or the Communications Department as the case may be. No publicity will be given to such information without reference to Defence Department.

(iii) Nothing that is said above restricts direct correspondence between any Department of the Government of India and Provincial Governments/etc. as regards departmental problems arising as a result of enemy action.

4. (i) The Civil Defence Department will receive reports only from Provincial Governments/etc. and not from any local officers direct.

(ii) Where there is a local Military Commander, the report should be drawn up by the Provincial Government/etc. in consultation with him.

(iii) The local Military Commander will be responsible for seeing that the concurrence of any Naval or Air Force Authorities within his jurisdiction is obtained and Provincial Governments/etc. need not concern themselves/etc. on this point.

5. Attached as Annexure I is a Questionnaire showing the subjects on which information is desired and it is requested that any suggestions as to the inclusion of any further sections or sub-sections should be sent as soon as possible.

The Questionnaire may appear formidable at first sight but the Government of India feel sure that Provincial Governments/etc. will agree that it is necessary that information as detailed as this should be collected for the following reasons: -

(a) The local Executive Officers will need to have accurate information on all these points in order to carry on immediate

administrati

administration and so as to mould their future policy and administration.

(b) Provincial Governments/etc. will need it for the same reason and also in order to enable them/etc. to issue Communiques, control publicity and compile a full and accurate history of Air Raids within their/etc. jurisdiction which will be of very great importance.

(c) The Government of India need it for the same reasons and also in order that they may be able to pass on to other Provinces and Administrations and to the Indian States information and advice based on experience gained in areas that have been attacked. The Government of India are, therefore, confident that they can count on the fullest co-operation in the supply of information desired.

6.(i) The Government of India suggest that, if it has not already been done, Provincial Governments/etc. should at once set up the necessary machinery in order to ensure that answers to the various questions would be submitted at the earliest possible moment.

The machinery would consist in farming out sections of the Questionnaire to the various executive officers concerned, to A.R.P. Services and to publicutilities and local self-governing bodies with directions that answers to the questions on which immediate information is required should be regarded as a duty of prime importance and one to be fulfilled at the earliest possible moment while answers to other questions to which an answer can be given at once should be submitted within a matter of hours after the hostile action had taken place.

(ii) Itwould be preferable to send in information on various items more or less as it comes in rather than to attempt to wait and submit one comprehensive report. To control this it would probably be necessary to direct that when an incomplete report is sent in a paragraph should be added that a report on the remaining points (to be specified) will be submitted as soon as the information is available.

Reports should be drawn up in the form of answers to each section and sub-section of the Questionnaire using narrative form where necessary but avoiding a continuous narrative embracing a number of sections and sub-sections of the Questionnaire.

(iii) It is thought that to do this will not only assist officers in drawing up a clear report on the points required but will greatly assist Provincial Governments/etc. and Administrations as well,as the Government of India not only in making sure that all the required information is in but also in collating subsequent reports with reports previously received. It might prove most convenient in the end to cut up the reports as they come in and to paste the answer to each sub-section on a sheet of paper and to paste below this any answers to the same sub-section received in subsequent reports. If this system was adopted it would be necessary to ask for reports to be written on one side of the page only.

(iv) Attached as Annexure II are copies of the four marginally noted letters issued by the Government of Bengal which illustrate well what is suggested in sub-paragraph (i) and in paragraph 4 above and may be of assistance to other Provincial Governments/etc. and Administrations.

74(2)P.-D, dated 16.1.42, 75(24)-P-D dated 16.1.42, 76(4)-P -D, dated 16.1.42, 77 P.D dated 16.1.42.

7. (i) It isrequested that information will be submitted on the

following

following lines: -

NATURE OF REPORT.	MILITARY ITEMS	CIVIL ITEMS.
Immediate Reports.	(1) By Military, if there is a Military Commander, to General Headquarters.	(1) By Military, if there is a Military Commande to General Headquarte
	(2) Otherwise by Civil Government in a safe cypher to Civil Defence Department, repeated to Defence Department.	(2) Otherwise by Civil Government in a safe cypher to Civil Defence Department.
Subsequent Reports.	By Military on Military items to General Headquarters.	By Civil Government in consultation with Mili tary Commander, if any to Civil Defence Department who will sh to General Staff (Military Intelligence before any statements issue to the public

(ii) It will be noticed that immediate reports on both civil and military items are to be submitted by the Military Commander where there is one but that after this the Military will not report on civil items although they are to be shown the civil report before it is sent to Civil Defence Department.

The portions of the Questionnaire which are Military items are underlined and all these are also immediate and have been marked M.I. in the margin. It will, therefore, be the concern of Provincial Governments/etc. to give the Military all information they/etc. collect on these subjects in order that a full report may reach the Government of India. It will be particularly appreciated that it is more than ever necessary that information on Military Immediate subjects should be sent in to Provincial Governments/etc. without delay by civil officers in areas where there are no Military.

8. (i) The Government of India would, be obliged if the following reports could reach it: -

1. Immediate Report (by code telegram or wireless or secret telephone, if possible).
2. Preliminary Report to be sent as soon after hostile action as possible.
3. A fuller report (to be known as the second report) drawn up on the same lines as the preliminary report but containing more detailed information to be sent within 24 hours.
4. After the second report a daily report until the situation returns to normal.

(ii) If there is a breakdown or great congestion of communications it may be necessary for Provincial Governments/etc. to send reports by special couriers.

9. Provincial Governments/etc. are requested to state how many spare copies, if any, they/etc. require of - (1) This letter, (2) Annexure I, & (3) Annexure II.

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VN

Letter from the Government of India, Civil Defence Department, to all Provincial Governments and Chief Commissioners, No.390/41-A.R.P., dated the 31st December 1941.

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The Provincial Governments have been addressed by the Government of India, in the Department of Information and Broadcasting letter No.335/41 of the 24th December 1941, regarding the necessity of their taking all possible action to contradict or prevent the spread of rumours and unconfirmed reports.

Though Provincial Governments are responsible for taking the initiative where this is possible, it is essential that the Government of India should also be in a position to contradict any flase reports which may gain currency in regard to enemy action, or the likeli hood of enemy action against India.

Further the Government of India need for general purposes of liaison to be fully in touch with what is going on.

I am, therefore, to request that the Provincial Government/you will send immediate telegraphic information of any incidents which are likely to become the subject of false and exaggerated reports.

2. The matters on which information is specially required are -

(a) Appearance of hostile aircraft or surface craft;
(b) Raids of any description, number of casualties, and extent of damage;
(c) Any large movement of population away from threatened areas;
(d) Any other matters affecting public morale.

The Provincial Government/you may be able to make additions to this list, either now or as the situation develops.

The reports should be sent to Civil Defence Department

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ANNEXTURE II.

Copy of a letter No.74(2)P.-D., dated the 16th January 1942 to the A.R.P. Controller, Railways, and the Chairman, Port Commissioners, ~~Xix~~ Calcutta.

---:O:---

The undersigned is directed to enclose a copy of the instructions that have been issued in this department's letter No.76P-D., dated the 16th January 1942, to the Commissioner of Police, District Magistrates, 24-Parganas, Howrah and Hooghly, regarding the despatch of information relating to an air raid to this Government.

If the reports on which the Government communiques will be based are to be complete, it is essential that they should receive information of the results of the air raids on the railways'/Port Commissioners' property. The undersigned is therefore, directed to request that the Chief Civil Defence Commissioner and the Director, Civil Defence, Calcutta area, may be furnished with the necessary information as soon after the raids as possible. It would immensely facilitate collation and examination if the information could be furnished by telephone and confirmed in writing in the prescribed form, a copy of which is enclosed.

---:O:---

Copy of a Memorandum No.75(24)P-D., dated the 16th January 1942 to all District Officers, Except 24-Parganas, Howrah, Hooghly.

The undersigned is directed to state that the question of reporting to Government in the event of an air raid taking place in any part of Bengal has been under consideration and it has been decided that the following action should be taken at such a time.

2. As soon after an air raid as possible, an express code telegram (to be known as the first telegram) is to be despatched to the Chief Secretary reporting that an air raid has taken place and indicating the places raided and giving as far as possible some indicating of the scale of attack, damage done to both personnel and material, state of morale and whether assistance is required, and, if so, what.

3. It is clearly to be understood that Government require the very earliest intimating of an air -raid taking place in your jurisdiction. If, therefore, it is not possible for you, when sending off the first telegram, to give details without delaying its desptach, the telegram should not be postponed on that account.

4. As soon as possible after a telegram has been despatched, a report (to be known as the preliminary report) should be sent by express letter and also by telephone, if a telephone is available giving details of the raid and amplifying, as far as possible, the necessarily meagre information contained in the 1st telegram. The report will be sent in the prescribed form, copy enclosed which will not be deviated from. When drawing up your report, you will naturally obtain as much information as is readily available from all officers subordinate to you -police, A.R.P. authorities (if such are in existence), civil defence organisations as well as from municipalities, railways and other organisations but the report must not be delayed on this account.

Not reproduced. It was a short questionnaire on the lines of Annexure I.

5. After the issue of the preliminary report, a fuller report (to be known as the second report) should be snet within 24 hours. This report should be drawn up on the same lines as the preliminary report but is expected to contain more detailed information than was possible when the preliminary report was written.

6. After the second report a daily report should be sent until the situation returns to normal.

7. If there is a military detachment in your district, both the first wire as well as the preliminary, second and

daily

daily reports should be sent in consultation with the military authorities. Copies of all reports and telegrams should be sent to your Divisional Commissioner.

8. Communiques to the press will only be issued by Chief Secretary from Calcutta through the Publicity Department. No information, therefore, is to be given to the local press by you until a communique has been issued in Calcutta. After a communique has been issued (it will be wired to you, if possible, immediately on issue), you may at your discretion allow statements regarding the raid to appear in the local papers. It is to be clearly understood however, that censorship is to be rigorously enforced whenever necessary and no statements are to appear without your knowledge and without your authority. When examining statements proposed to be issued in the press, attention should be paid to the necessity for raising public morale, avoiding any suggestion of panic and ensuring that examples of heroism and steadiness are given prominence.

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Copy of a letter no.76(4)P.-D., dated the 16th January 1942 to the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta and District Magistrates of 24-Parganas, Howrah and Hooghly.

The undersigned is directed to state that the question of reporting to Government in the event of an air-raid taking place in any part of your district (in Calcutta) has been under consideration and it has been decided that the following action should be taken at such a time.

( ) for Commissioner of Police.

2. During an air raid the Chief Civil Defence Commissioner/ the Director, Civil Defence will have to be kept informed periodically of the general situation. Information will be supplied ~~xxxx~~ over the'phone, if possible, and, if not, by messenger. The information given during such periodical appreciations cannot be of a set character but must depend on circumstances.

3. As soon after an air raid as possible, a report (to be known as the preliminary report) should be sent by telephone, if possi

and

and, if not, by a messenger giving details of the raid so far as they are known at that time.

4. The report will be sent in the prescribed form, copy * enclosed, which will not be deviated from. When drawing up your report, you will naturally obtain information from all officers suboridate to you -police, A.R.P. authorities and civil defence organisations. Reports will not be received or asked for by you from railways and Port Commissioners as these organisations will report to the Chief Civil Defence Commissioner/ the Director, Civil Defence, direct. If the preliminary report is sent over the 'phone, it will be subsequently confirmed by a written report. This report is not to be delayed and must be furnished even if exact details are not ~~xixxxx~~ available.

* Not reproduced. It was a short questionnaire on the lines of Annexture I.

5. After the issue of the preliminary report, a fuller report (to be known as the second report) should be sent within 24 hours. This report should be drawn up on the same lines as the preliminary report, but it is expected to contain more detailed information than ~~was~~ possible when the preliminary report was written.

6. After the second report, a daily report should be sent until the situation returns to normal.

(Copies of all reports should be sent to your Divisional Commissioner).

( ) for District Magistrates only.

7. Communiques or statements to the press will only be issued by the Chief Secretary from Calcutta through the Publicity Department. No information, therefore, is to be given to the local press by you until a communique has been issued in Calcutta. After a communique has been issued, you may, at your discretion, allow statements regarding the raid to appear in the local newspapers that are published in your district. It is to be clearly understood, however, that censorship is to be rigorously enforced whenever necessary. No statements are to appear without your knowledge and without your authority. When examining statements proposed to be issued in your local newspapers, attention should be paid to the necessity for raising public morale, avoiding any suggestion of panic and ensuring that examples of ~~heroism~~ and steadiness

steadiness are given prominence).

( ) for District Magistrates only.

(Censorship and the scrutiny of all statements proposed to be made by the press in Calcutta will be carried out by the Special Press Adviser.)

( ) for Commissioner of Police only.

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Copy of a letter No.77P--D., dated the 16th January 1942 to the Commander, Presidency and Assam District.

I am directed to state that the problem of the receipt of reports of air-raids and the preparation of the necessary communiques to be issued by Government after the raids has been under consideration.

Instructions have now been issued by this Department's letters No.74P.--D., 75P.--D. and 76P.--D., dated the 16th January 1942, to the local officers of Government and to the railway administrations and Commissioners for the port of Calcutta to ensure that this Government is fully supplied with the necessary information. Copies of these instructions are enclosed.

In this connection, I am to enclose a copy of telegram No.7499, dated the 29th December 1941 from the Civil Defence Department, Government of India, which has already been discussed with Major Walton of the Presidency and Assam District staff. The arrangments reached in discussion with Major Walton for the issue of the various military and civil communiques was as follows:-

(a) The military/air authorities will compile their own communique as soon after a raid as possible and, when doing,so, will let this Government know if they require any information fr them for their communique. This communique will be seen by

Chief

Chief Secretary or his representative before issue.

(b) The Communique or communique that might be issued by Chief Secretary on behalf of this Government will be shown to or read over to the Presidency and Assam District representative, before issue.

(c) When raids take place in areas where there are no military detachment, information will be supplied by the local officers to this Government and will be forwarded to the Presidency and Assam District for the compilation of the military/air communique.

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Copy of a Telegram No.7499, dated the 29th December 1941, from Foreign, New Delhi.

Civil Defence Department. Arrangements for publication of communiques if air raid occur on India should now be considered. Government of India re satisfied that earliest possible information must be issued by Provincial Governments.

2. Local military or Air Headquarters will after raid prepare brief communique but Government of India suggest that this should be supplemented by informative press note from Provincial Governmen as press will otherwise be encouraged to supplement it. Press note should be prompt and designed to raise public morale, avoiding any suggestion that panic has occurred and stressing examples of heroism and steadiness of the population. Procedure could be arrived at locally, but consultation with military and air authorities essential.

3. Order under ule 41(a) Defence of India Rules will be required and Government of India re issuing one. It will be necessary now to make preparations for pressing on 24 hour basi

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ANNEXURE I.

QUESTIONNAIRE.

1. AIR RAID WARNINGS.
   (a) Time when Yellow warning was received.
   (b) Time when Red warning was received.
   (c) Time when Air Raid Alarm was sounded.
   (d) How much time elapsed between the sounding of the Air Raid Alarm and the actual arrival of raiders ?
   (e) Was the Air Raid Alarm audible ?
   (f) Did the populace take cover ?
   (g) Did traffic get off the streets promptly ?
   (h) Was there any obstruction of Air Raid Precautions vehicles ?
   (i) How long after the warning was the All Clear sounded ?
M.I. (j) Were any bogus wireless or other messages received
   (k) Any other points.
   (l) Suggestions.

2. OBSCURATION.
   (a) Was total obscuration secured ?
   (b) How long after the Warning did it take to secure it ?
   (c) Was obscuration good or bad in the localities where bombs fell?
   (d) Any other points.
   (e) Suggestions.

3. A.R.P. CONTROL ROOMS.
   (a) Did they function satisfactorily ?
   (b) If not, in what respects did they fail ?
   (c) Was telephonic communication satisfactory ?
   (d) Was the Messenger Service used and was it satisfactory ?
   (e) How long was the staff on duty and were reliefs necessary ?
   (f) Number of incidents reported.
   (g) Any other points.
   (h) Suggestions.

4. REPORT CENTRES.
   (a) Did they function satisfactorily ?
   (b) If not, in what respects did they fail ?
   (c) Was the telephonic communication satisfactory ?
   (d) Was the Messenger Service used and was it satisfactory ?
   (e) How long was the staff on duty and were reliefs necessary ?
   (f) Number of incidents reported.
   (g) Any other points.
   (h) Suggestions.

5. AIR RAID WARDENS.
   (a) Did they function satisfactorily ?
   (b) If not, in what respects did they fail ?
   (c) Were there any casualties ?
   (d) How long were the Wardens on duty and did the relief system work ?
   (e) Was the number sufficient ?
   (f) Any other points.
   (g) Suggestions.

A
CASULTY SERVICES.

(i) FIXED FIRST AID POSTS.
(a) Did they function satisfactorily ?
(b) If not, in what respects did they fail ?
(c) Were there any casualties among the personnel ?
(d) Were any First Aid Posts damaged by bombs ?
(e) How many cases did they deal with ?
(f) Of the number given in (e) how many did they send on to hospital ?
(g) How long were the staffs on duty and were reliefs necessary ?
(h) Was the number sufficient ?
(i) Any other points.
(j) Suggestions.

(ii) MOBILE FIRST AID POSTS.
(a) Did they function satisfactorily ?
(b) If not, in what respects did they fail ?
(c) Were there any casualties among the personnel ?
(d) Were any First Aid Posts damaged by bombs ?
(e) How many cases did they deal with ?
(f) Of the number given in (e) how many did they send on to hospital ?
(g) How long were the staffs on duty and were reliefs necessary.
(h) Was the number sufficient ?
(i) Any other points.
(j) Suggestions.

(iii) MOBILE FIRST AID PARTIES.
(a) Did they function satisfactorily ?
(b) If not, in what respects did they fail ?
(c) Were there any casualties mong the personnel ?
(d) Was any damage done to equipment through bombs or accident ?
(e) How many cases did they deal with ?
(f) Of the number given in (e) how many did they send on to hospital ?
(g) How long were these units on duty ?
(h) How many units were there and how many were used ?
(i) Was the number sufficient ?
(j) Any other points.
(k) Suggestions.

(iv) AMBULANCE SERVICE.
(a) Did it function satisfactorily ?
(b) If not, in what respects did it fail ?
(c) Were there any casualties among the personnel ?
(d) Was there any damage done to equipment through bombs or accident ?
(e) How many cases did it deal with ?
(f) How long was it at work ?
(g) How many ambulances were there and how many were used ?
(h) Was the number sufficient ?
(i) Any other points.
(j) Suggestions.

7. RESCUE PARTIES.
(a) Did they function satisfactorily ?
(b) If not, in what respects did they fail ?
(c) Were there any casualties among the personnel ?
(d) Was any damage done to equipment through bombs or accident ?
(e) How many incidents did they deal with ?
(f) How long were they at work ?
(g) How many parties were there and how many were used ?

(h) Was the number sufficient ?
(i) How many persons did they rescue alive ?
(j) Any other points.
(k) Suggestions.

8. STREET FIRE PARTIES.
(a) Did they function satisfactorily ?
(b) If not, in what respects did they fail ?
(c) Were there any casualties among the personnel ?
(d) How many fires did they deal with ?
(e) How many fires did they control without calling on the Fire Brigade or Trailer Pump Squads ?
(f) How long were they at work ?
(g) Was the number sufficient ?
(h) Did the public help adequately ?
(i) How many fires did the public extinguish without calling on any of the fire fighting services ?
(j) Did Fire watchers function satisfactorily ?
(k) Any other points.
(l) Suggestions.

9. GAS IDENTIFICATION SERVICE.
(a) Did it function satisfactorily ?
(b) If not, in what respects did it fail ?
(c) Were there any casualties among the personnel:-
(i) from gas ?
(ii) from other causes ?

(d) How long was the personnel at work ?
(e) Was the establishment sufficient ?
(f) Any other points.
(g) Suggestions.

10. GAS DECONTAMINATION SERVICE.
(a) Did it function satisfactorily ?
(b) If not, in what respects did it fail ?
(c) Were there any casualties among the personnel:-
(i) from gas ?
(ii) from other causes ?

(d) How long was the personnel at work ?
(e) Was the establishment sufficient ?
(f) Any other points.
(g) Suggestions.

11. A. R. P. Depots.
(a) Did they function satisfactorily ?
(b) If not, in what respect did they fail ?
(c) Any other points.
(d) Suggestions.

12. FIRE BRIGADES AND TRAILER PUMP SQUADS.
(a) Did they function satisfactorily ?
(b) If not, in what respects did they fail ?
(c) Were there any casualties among the personnel ?
(d) Was any equipment damaged or destroyed by bombs or accidents ?
(e) How many fires were caused other than those in para. 8 (e) and (i).
(f) How many of these were put out ?
(g) How many hours after the raid was it before all fires were under control ?
(h) How long were the Fire Brigade Parties at work ?
(i) Were any reliefs possible ?

(j)

(j) Were the numbers of firemen and amount of pumps and equipment adequate ?
(k) Was the water supply adequate ?
(l) Were many demolitions necessary to prevent fire spreading ?
(m) What buildings were set on fire ?
(n) What was approximate figure in rupees of damage caused by fire ?
(o) Was there any delay in fire fighting services setting to the scene of fires ?
(p) Were the arrangements for summoning them satisfactory ?
(q) Any other points.
(r) Suggestions.

13. MOBILE REPAIR UNITS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES AND FOR MAINTENANCE OF VITAL SERVICES SUCH AS COMMUNICATIONS, WATER SUPPLY, DRAINAGE, ETC.

(a) Did they function satisfactorily ?
(b) If not, in what respects did they fail ?
(c) Were there any casualties among the personnel ?
(d) Was any equipment destroyed or damaged by bombs or accident ?
(e) How many parties of various kinds had to function ?
(f) How long did they have to work ?
(g) Were reliefs necessary ?
(h) Was the number of parties and their equipment adequate ?
(i) Any other points.
(j) Suggestions.

14. HOSPITALS.

(a) Did they function satisfactorily ?
(b) If not, in what respects did they fail ?
(c) Were there any casualties among the personnel ?
(d) Were any Hospitals damaged by bombs ?
(e) How many beds were ready to receive casualties at the time the raid started ?
(f) How many wounded persons admitted to hospital were discharged after
1 week
2 weeks.
3 weeks.
4 weeks.
5 weeks.
6 weeks.
Over 6 weeks.
(g) How many died after admission ?
(h) Was there any difficulty in disposing of dead bodies ?
(i) Was the number of beds and the amount of equipment adequate ?
(j) How long was it before all operations were completed ?
(k) Any other points.
(l) Suggestions.

15. CORPSE DISPOSAL ORGANIZATION.

(a) Did it function satisfactorily ?
(b) If not, in what respects did it fail ?
(c) How many corpses did it dispose of ?
(d) How many of these were unidentified ?
(e) Did friends or relations come to identify corpses ?
(f) Was mass burial or mass cremation resorted to ?
(g) If so, how many corpses were disposed of by:-
(i) mass ~~exm~~ burial ?
(ii) mass cremation ?

(h) How long was it after the All Clear before all corpses were removed from the streets ?
(i) Who did the actual handling and removal of corpses ?
(j) Any other points.
(k) Suggestions.

16. SALVAGE ORGANIZATION? INCLUDING DEMOLITION AND CLEARANCE OF DEBRIS.

(a) Did this function satisfactorily:-
(i) As regards mobile parties for immediate salvage ?
(ii) As regards leisurely salvage, demolition and clearance of debris and disposal of salvaged articles ?
(b) Approximately what quantities of what classes of salvaged material such as metals, bricks, timber were sold to the Supply Department ?

17. FEEDING THE SERVICES.
(a) What steps were taken to provide food for police, fire brigade and Air Raid Precautions services ?
(b) Were they adequate ?
(c) Suggestions.

18. REINFORCEMENTS.
(a) Were these necessary in any areas in respect of any of the mobile A.R.P. or Fire fighting Services ?
(b) If so, were they arranged satisfactorily ?
(c) Any other points.
(d) Suggestions.

19. CARE OF HOMELESS.

M.I. (a) About how many people needed food and shelter on account of being bombed out of their homes or of being removed on account of unexploded bombs*
(b) Did the arrangements work satisfactorily ?
(c) If not, in what respects did they fail ?

*N.B. After the Immediate Report has been submitted this will be treated as a Civil item.

20. EVACUATION.
M.I. (a) About what numbers joined in the Evacuation ?
M.I (b) Was it mostly on foot and along what roads ?
M.I (c) How much was by railway and along what lines ?
M.I (d) Extent to which panic evacuation was checked and people began to return.
(e) Did any pre-arranged schemes work according to plan ?
(f) If not, in what respects did they fail ?
(g) Any other points.
(h) Suggestions.

NATURE OF ATTACK.

M.I.- (i) From which direction did the attack come ?
M.I.- (ii) Number of bombers and fighters in each wave.
M.I.- (iii) Number of waves.
M.I.- (iv) Heights of raiders.
M.I.- (v) Number of bombs dropped.
M.I.- (vi) Number of resulting incidents.
M.I.- (vii) Kind of bombs - H.E., A.P., Incendiary, Gas, Delayed Action.
M.I.- (viii) Any machine gunning ?
M.I.- (ix) Number of hostile bombers and fighters brought down- (a) by A.A.fire. (b) by our fighters. (c) by crashing.
M.I.- (x) Number of our aircraft brought down.
M.I.- (xi) Number of hostile airmen - (a) killed. (b) taken prisor
M.I.- (xii) Number of our airmen - (a) killed. (b) saved alive fron our aircraft brought down.
M.I.- (xiii) Number of paratroops landed.
M.I.- (xiv) Number of enemy troops landed by troop-carrying planes.
M.I.- (xv) Nature and extent of gas attack.
M.I.- (xvi) Magnetic and land mines dropped.
(a) Number reported
(b) Number dealt with
(c) Number requiring attention.
(d) Assistance required.
M.I.- (xvii) Unexploded bombs.
(a) Number reported.
(b) Number dealt with
(c) Number requiring attention.
(d) Assistance required.
M.I.-(xviii) Leaflets dropped.
M.I.- (xix) Any other object dropped.

M.I.- 22. PRINCIPLE OBJECTIVE AGAINST WHICH ATTACK APPARENTLY DIRECTED.

M.I.- 23. EXTENT TO WHICH APPARENT OBJECT OF ATTACK WAS ACHIEVED. (Particular reference should be made to serious damage to important buildings; munitions factories; docks; Railways and other communications and to water supply where it may affect troop movements.)

M.I.- 24. CASUALTIES.

What was the number (gas casualties separately)
(a) Killed
(b) Injured and admitted to hospital.
(c) Injured and not admitted to hospital.
(d) Missing.
(e) Total.

25. MORALE
a) What was the general state of the morale of:-
(i) The general public.
(ii) The police and Civic Guards.
(iii) The A.R.P. Services.
(iv) Hospital Staffs.
(v) Fire Brigades and Trailer Pump Squads.
(vi) Public Utility Concerns.
(vii) Government servants.
(viii) Local Self Governing Bodies:-
(1) Municipal Commissioners.
(2) Executive Officers.
(3) Labour.

(ix) Railways:-
(1) Superior and clerical Staff.
(2) Labour (including Engine Drivers, Signal men, etc.
(x) Ports:-
(1) General Port Staffs.
(2) Dock Labour.
(3) Crews of vessels.
(xi) Educational Institutions.
(xii) Domestic servants.
(xiii) Factory labour.
(xiv) General unorganised labour.
(xv) Small shopkeeper class.
(xvi) Transport - buses, taxis, lorries, trams.
(xvii) Clerical staffs in business houses.

M.I.- (xviii) General appreciation of morale of Civil, Military and public.

(b) What steps were taken, after the Raid to inform the Public of the facts and to re-assure them ?
(c) Did the public obey the orders and instructions issued by the authorities ?
(d) If not, is further propaganda needed, in what directions and of what kind ?
(e) Did the arrangements for Press Advising Work Satisfactorily ?
(f) If not, in what way could they be improved ?

26. EFFECTS OF RAID ON THE A.R.P. SERVICES, CIVIC GUARDS, POLICE, ETC.
(a) Resignations or desertions.
(b) New recruitment.

M.I.- 27. CRIME DURING AND AFTER-RAID - ESPECIALLY LOOTING.

* N.B.- After the immediate report has been submitted this will be treated as a Civil Item.

M.I.- 28.- FIFTH COLUMN ACTIVITIES AND ESPECIALLY THOSE OF THE TERRORIST GROUPS.

* N.B.- After the immediate report has been submitted this will be treated as a Civil item.

29. WORKING OF CIVIC GUARDS, POLICE AND POLICE ARRANGEMENTS.

30. DAMAGE CAUSED.

(i) General survey.
(ii) Particulars of serious damage to important buildings; munitions factories; Docks, ships, railways and rolling stock, bridges and industrial concerns. (See also questions 28 - 33)
(iii) Effect of damage on production of War material.
(iv) When is full production expected to be restored ?

31. COMMUNICATIONS.

M.I.- (a) Effect of Raid on communications:-
M.I.- (i) Roads.
M.I.- (ii) Railways.
M.I.- (iii) Telephones.
M.I.- (iv) Telegraphs.
M.I.- (v) Posts.
M.I.- (vi) Ports and Shipping.
M.I.- (vii) Civil Aviation.

32. WORKING OF TELEPHONE SYSTEM DURING RAID.
(a) Did it receive and transmit the Warning efficiently ?
(b) Apart from interruption due to destruction of plant by bombs did it function satisfactorily ?
(c) If not, in what respects did it fail ?
(d) Did the staffs at the Exchanges stick to their posts ?
(e) Were the wires congested with messages ?
(f) What damage was done by bombs ?
(g) Any other points.
(h) Suggestions.

33. WATER SUPPLY:-

(1) Drinking Water

(a) Was this affected ?
(b) Was there an alternative system and did this work satisfactorily ?
(c) Suggestions.

(2) UNFILTERED WATER SUPPLY

(a) Was this affected ?
(b) What was the result ?
(c) Suggestions.

34. COAL GAS
(a) Was any damage caused to the gas supply arrangements ?
(b) If so, were the results serious ?
(c) Suggestions.

35. ELECTRICITY.

(a) Was any damage caused to the Electric supply arrangements ?
(b) If so, was the result serious ?
(c) Suggestions.

36. CONSERVANCY AND SANITATION.

(a) Did this continue to function ?
(b) If not, what was the result ?
(c) Suggestions.

37. EPIDEMICS

M.I.- (a) Did any epidemics break out ?*
(b) If so, what steps were taken to check them ?
(c) Suggestions.

*N.B. After the immediate report this will be treated as a Civil item.

38. SHELTERS AND SLIT TRENCHES.

(a) Extent to which used by public ?
(b) Extent to which they afforded protection
(c) Number of people killed and wounded inside buildings ?
(d) Number of people killed and wounded in streets and open places ?
(e) Suggestions.

39. ANIMALS.

(a) Any instances of obstruction to A.R.P. vehicles or of danger to public from animals-cows, buffaloes, goats, dogs - not under control.
(b) Zoos.
(c) Suggestions.

40. MAINTENANCE OF FOOD SUPPLIES.

41. EFFECTS OF RAID ON PRICES AND MARKETS.

42. WORKING OF CIVIL DEFENCE INFORMATION BUREAUX.

43. WERE THE GENERAL PREPARATIONS MADE INADEQUATE IN ANY RESPECT?

44. LIAISON AND CO-OPERATION BETWEEN CIVIL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

(Including the extent to which Military were compelled to assist in Civil Defence measures and the extent to which they had to ask for assistance from the Civil Authorities.)

45. EMERGENCY ADMINISTRATION.

(a) Was any use made by District Magistrates, etc., of the Special Emergency powers under the Defence of India Rules with which they have been vested ?
(b) Are any extra powers needed ?

46. PUBLIC OPINION.

Attitude of -
(a) The Press.
(b) Political Parties.
(c) The Legislatures.
(d) Public Opinion generally to the Raids, to the civil Defence Measures and to Military Defence Measures.

Cpl/1818 d 27 3 42
W 91-41-2.

To

The Secy. to the Resident.

Collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects.

Sir,

With reference to your letter No.3(15)-42/W dated the 14th March 1942 on the above subject, I am directed to state that this Govt. will be glad to co-operate fully in the scheme drawn up by the Govt. of India in the matter.

I have etc.

Chief Secy. to Govt.

SECRET.

27th March 1942.

Ro 1818

The Secretary to the Hon'ble the Resident in Mysore.

Collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects.

With reference to your letter No.3(15)-42/W dated the 14th March 1942 on the above subject, I am directed to state that this Government will be glad to co-operate fully in the scheme drawn up by the Government of India in the matter.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Sd.) M.G. Mehkri.

for Chief Secretary to Governme

Memo No. Dated the 27th March 1942.

Copy of the above is forwarded with compliments to the Inspector-General of Police in Mysore, for information. Copies of the Residency letter and of the enclosures thereto and five copies of the questionnaire accompany.

For Chief Secretary to Government.

W91-41-3.

No. 2194-2202/W. dt. 27.3.42

To

The Dist. Magistrates of Dists.

Sir,

In forwarding herewith a copy of letter from the Residency dated the 14th March 1942 together with copies of the letters of the Govt. of India referred to therein in the matter of collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects, I am directed to state that the Govt. have agreed ~~fully~~ to fully co-operate with the Govt. of India in the matter and to request you to be so good as to send the information ~~from time to time~~ on the lines indicated therein to this office for consolidation and transmission to the Residency.

In this connection I am also to enclose for your information a copy of the questionnaire received from the Govt. of India and also copies of letters dated the 16th Janry. 1942 addressed by the Govt. of Bengal to its Dist. Magistrates issuing instructions in ~~the~~ this matter.

I have etc.,

Chief Secy. to Govt.

Memo No. 2203/W

Copy to I.G.P. ~~with copies of Resy. letter and enclosures together with copies of questionnaire~~ for information and necessary action.

GOVERNMENT OF HIS HIGHNESS THE MAHARAJA OF MYSORE.

General and Revenue Secretariat,

No. 2194-2202/R. Rnels. *Dated Bangalore, ...27th March 1942.*

FROM

Chief

The Secretary to the Government of His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore,

To

The District Magistrates of Districts.

Sir,

In forwarding herewith a copy of letter from the Residency dated the 14th March 1942 together with copies of the letters of the Government of India referred to therein in the matter of collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects, I am directed to state that Government have agreed fully to co-operate with the Government of India in the matter and to request you to be so good as to send the information on the lines indicated therein to this office for consolidation and transmission to the Residency.

In this connection, I am also to enclose for your information a copy of the questionnaire received from the Government of India and also copies of letters dated the 16th January 1942 addressed by the Government of Bengal to its District Magistrates issuing instructions in this matter.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,

(Sd.) M.G. Mehkri.
For Chief Secretary to Government.

Memo No. Dated the 27th March 1942.

Copy of the above is forwarded with compliments to the Inspector-General of Police in Mysore, for information.

For Chief Secy. to Govt.

The reply to this communication should be addressed to the Secretary to the Resident in Mysore, Bangalore, by designation and not by name.

URGENT & SECRET. W91-41-4. 1487/W

No. F.3(15)-42/W.

FROM

THE SECRETARY
TO THE HON'BLE THE RESIDENT IN MYSORE.

To

The Chief Secretary to the Government of
His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore,
Bangalore.

Dated Bangalore, the 4th April *1942*

4 APR 1942 GOVT. OF MYSORE.

Collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects.

SIR,

I am directed to refer to my letter No.F.3(15)-42/W, dated the 16th March 1942.

2. The Government of India, Civil Defence Department state that in order to enable them to appreciate fully the reports that will be sent they require maps of all Class I, II and III towns. I am accordingly to request that town maps of Bhadravati, Mysore City, Bangalore City and Kolar Gold Fields may kindly be sent urgently direct to the Government

of

of India, Civil Defence Department, and the fact intimated to this Residency in due course.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,

for SECRETARY TO THE RESIDENT.

KK

SECRET & IMMEDIATE.

D. O.

GENERAL AND REVENUE SECRETARIAT,

Dated Bangalore, 6th April 1942.

No. 2310-13/4
W91-41-5

Collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects.

Dear Sir,

I am desired to inform you that the Residency have written to say that the Government of India, Civil Defence Department state that in order to enable them to appreciate fully the reports that will be sent, they require maps of all Class I, II and III towns. I am accordingly to request that the town map of Bhadravati / B. City / K. G. F. / M. City may kindly be sent to this office immediately, for transmission to the Government of India.

Yours sincerely,

For Chief Secretary to Government.

B. Viswanath Esq
N. Narasimharaj Esq
K. Duraiswamier Esq.
B. S. Raghavendra Rao Esq

W 91-41-6.

1526/W.

THE MYSORE IRON & STEEL WORKS,

(GOVERNMENT OF MYSORE)

TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS
'MYSIRON' BHADRAVATI
CODES:
BENTLEY'S
WESTERN UNION FIVE LETTER
A. B. C. 6TH EDITION

BHADRAVATI. (INDIA)

7th April 1942.

Ref. No. G. 1942

SECRET.

The Chief Secretary to the
Government of His Highness
the Maharaja of Mysore,
Public Offices, BANGALORE.

Dear Sir,

Collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects.

With reference to your letter No.2310-13/W dated the 6th April 1942, I beg to forward herewith a town map of Bhadravati showing the Industrial area, for transmission to the Government of India.

Yours faithfully,

General Manager.

Encl: 1.

BVM:

WD 02724—GPB—40,000—8-7-41

W91-41-4.

Form No. 24] MYSORE POLICE DEPARTMENT. 1527/W

In reply, please quote number, date and short title.*

Received.....*Registered*.....

From (Name) N. Madhava Rao, Esq., B.A.,

(Designation) A.R.P. Controller,

Post Box....., (STATION) .....Bangalore City...

Telegraphic Address .....

War

CHIEF S... 8. APR. ... OF ...

To

The Chief Secretary to the Government of
His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore,
Bangalore.

SIR, ARP. *No.* 434 /41-42 *dated*....7th April,...*194* 2.

ENCLOSURES ....
One.
.....
.....

SPARE COPIES .....

With reference to your letter No. 2310-13/W dated 6th April, 1942, I have the honour to enclose a map of Bangalore City area.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant

For. A.R.P. Controller.

KVN.

W 91-41-8

1528/W

No. G.T. 2369
Encl. one bill & Map.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
CITY MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, MYSORE.

Date 8-4-1942.

From B.S.RAGHAVENDRA RAO, ESQ., M.A.,(Hons)
~~M.NAVANEETHAM NAIDU, Esq., B.A., B.L.~~.
PRESIDENT, CITY MUNICIPAL COUNCIL,
MYSORE.

To
M.G. Mehkri, Esq., B.A.,LL.B.,
Chief Secretary to the Government of Mysore,
Bangalore.

Sir,

Adverting to your D.O.No.2310-13/41 dated 6-4-42, I have the honor to forward herewith a big size map of the Mysore City, with a bill of cost in duplicate and to request that the receipt of the same may kindly be acknowledged.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
B Raghavendra Rao
President.7.4

snr:-

7.4.942

original

Bill No: 2/7-4-42.

Office of the President,
City Municipality,
Mysore, the 7th April, 1942.

BILL.

Cost of one big size map of Mysore City: Rs. 3-0-0

RUPEES THREE ONLY.

B Nagendra

President.

snr:-

Mor
7.4.942

Duplicate

Bill No: 2/7-4-42.

Office of the President,
City Municipality,
Mysore, the 7th April, 1942.

BILL.

Cost of one big size map of Mysore City: Rs. 3-0-0

RUPEES THREE ONLY.

B Narasimhaiah

President.

snr:-

7.4.1942

W91-41-9.

Telegraphic Address:—
"MINESPECTOR"

GOVERNMENT OF MYSORE.

DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND EXPLOSIVES.

D. O. No. 2124

Enclosed packet containing plans of K. G. F. (10 sheets)

Dated Oorgaum, 8th April 1942.
(S. India).

SECRET & IMMEDIATE

Dear Sir,

Collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects.

With reference to your D.O. letter No.2310-13/W. dated 6th April 1942 requesting that the Town Map of the Kolar Gold Field be sent for transmission to the Government of India Civil Defence Department, I beg to state that Kolar Gold Field is not termed as a town and a single map for the whole Field is not available. It comprises of different mining camps viz. Mysore, Champion Reef, Ooregum and Nundydroog Mines and surface plans of these showing shaft heads, mine works, buildings, roads, etc. are sent in a separate packet. A copy of the map of the whole Kolar Gold Field (Mining area) and a blue print showing the K.G.F., Sanitary Board and Mining areas are also enclosed with them. The receipt of the plans may kindly be acknowledged.

Yours sincerely,

K. Venkatiswamiah

Gulam Mohiyuddin Mehkri, Esq., B.A.,LL.B.,
Chief Secretary to the Government of
His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore,
Bangalore.

Mysore Mine	- surface plan	1 sheet
Champion Reef	- do	3 sheets
Ooregum Mine	- do	1 sheet
Nundydroog Mine	do	3 sheets
Map of Kolar Gold Field	...	1
Blue print of Sanitary and Mining area	... ...	1
	Total.-	10 sheets.

Appendix F G—1]

SUBJECT.....

.....

.....

Diary No. of letter replied to.....

General and Revenue Secretariat

( )

the *19* .

Date of issue 11.4.1942

Signed by Mr. S. K. V

List of enclosures.....

Copied by .....

Examined by.....

Section

File No.

Serial No.

Secret & Urgent

No. ~~Est 1933 Ctl~~

To The Secretary,
Civil Defence Dept
Govt of India
New Delhi

Sir,

Collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects.

~~To derive by~~ Under the Hyderabad Civil ~~the Resident at Bln~~ in their letter No. 7-3(15)-42(2) dt. 4.4.42 that the Civil Defence Dept require maps of all class I, II & III towns in this State in order to enable them to appreciate fully the reports that will be sent on the above subject are requesting that ~~the~~ towns maps of Bhimavaltu, Bangalore City, Mysore City and Kolar may be sent direct to the Govt of India, Civil Defence Dept.

I am directed to enclose herein
the marginally noted papers relative to the above claim
for reference by the Govt of India. Which
Kindly acknowledge receipt thereof.

I have
the
Chief Secretary Govt.

Copy of the Resolution No 7=C(1)-Cor(a)
dated 4.6.1921

By Separate letter

W91-41-10.

SECRET &
IMMEDIATE.

By Regd Post

11th April 1942.

No. 2396-W.
Encs 4 maps.

The Secretary,
Civil Defence Department,
Government of India,
New Delhi.

Collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects.

- - - -

The Secretary to the Hon'ble the Resident at Bangalore has in his letter No.F.3(15)-42/W dated the 4th April 1942 stated that the Civil Defence Department requires maps of all class I, II and III towns in this State in order to enable them to appreciate fully the reports that will be sent on the above subject and requested that the town maps of Bhadravati, Bangalore City, Mysore City and Kolar Gold Fields, may be sent direct to the Government of India, Civil Defence Department. I am accordingly to enclose herein the town maps of the above places for reference by the Government of India.

Their receipt may kindly be acknowledged.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,

Chief Secretary to Government.

SECRET &
IMMEDIATE.

11th April 1942.

Pol 1933 (1) –

W91-41-11.

The Secretary to the Hon'ble the Resident in Mysore.

Collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects.

- - - - - -

With reference to your letter No.F.3(15)-42/W dated the 4th April 1942 on the above subject, I am directed to state that the town maps of Bhadravati, Mysore City, Bangalore City and Kolar Gold Fields, have this day been sent direct to the Government of India, Civil Defence Department, as desired. A copy of letter addressed to them in this connection is enclosed for information.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,

For Chief Secretary to Government.

D. C. 3]

In reply please refer to—

No. Jl.P.R.796/41-42

Returned Sent

W 91-41-12. 1553/W-

OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE,
KADUR DISTRICT.

Chikmagalur, dated.....9th..April.....*193* 42

FROM

K. Srinivasan, Esquire, B.Sc.,
District Magistrate,
Kadur District.

Gulam Mohiyuddin Mehkri, Esquire, B.A., LL.B.,
Chief *Secretary to the Government of His Highness*
the Maharaja of Mysore,
.....~~Department~~
BANGALORE.

SIR,

Subject:- Submission of preliminary and fuller reports of hostile attacks, if any.

With reference to your letter No.2194-2202/II dated 27th March 1942 on the above subject, I have the honour to state that instructions have been issued to all the Amildars and other officers concerned to submit promptly the required reports to me in case of any hostile activities within their jurisdiction. In this connection, I beg to request that 20 copies of the questionnoire (annexture 1 to your letter referred to above) may kindly be caused to be sent to this office for distribution amongst the several officers for their guidance, when drawing up their reports.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,

S. Srinivasan

For District Magistrate,
Kadur District.
Absent from Headquarters

URGENT.
SECRET.

W 91-41-13.

14th April 1942.

No. 2488/W
Encs 9.

The Superintendent,
Government Printing.

I am directed to request you kindly to arrange to print and supply 300 copies of the enclosed questionnaire, very early.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,

For Chief Secretary to Government.

SECRET. W 91-41-14.

GOVERNMENT OF HIS HIGHNESS THE MAHARAJA OF MYSORE.

No. 2793-801/W. General and Revenue Secretariat,

With Enes. Dated Bangalore, 2nd May 1942.

FROM

The Chief Secretary to the Government of His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore.

To

The District Magistrates of Districts.

SIR,

Collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects.

In continuation of this office letter No.2194-2202/W dated the 27th March 1942 on the above subject, I am directed to forward for your use copies of the questionnaire referred to in paragraph 2 of the above letter.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,

For Chief Secretary to Government.

W 91-41-15.

2224/W.

SECRET

THE OFFICE OF THE HON'BLE THE RESIDENT IN MYSORE,

Dated Bangalore, the 2nd June 1942.

No.F.3(15)-42/W.

A copy of the undermentioned papers is forwarded with compliments to the Chief Secretary to the Government of His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore, Bangalore, for information, in continuation of letter from this Residency No.F.3(15)-42/W, dated the 16th March 1942.

14

By order, etc.,

FOR SECRETARY TO THE RESIDENT.

- - -

1. Government of India, Civil Defence Department Circular letter No.190/42, dated the 27th April 1942.

2. Government of India, Civil Defence Department Circular letter No.208/42, dated the 9th May 1942.

VN

No.84/42-ARP (C.D).
Government of India,
Civil Defence Department.

From

Lt.-Col. A.J. Reeve,
Deputy Secretary to the Government of India.

To

All Provincial Governments and
Chief Commissioners.

Civil Defence Department Circular No. 190/42.

New Delhi, the 27th April 1942.

Subject:- Report on air raids on Vizagapatam.

Sir,

With reference to this Department's letter No.390/41-ARP(C.D.) dated the 19th February, 1942, on the subject of reporting information regarding hostile attacks and their effects, I am directed to forward herewith the report on the air raids on Vizagapatam received from the Government of Madras.

2. The value of the report is apparent and it is clear that the questionnaire forwarded with the above letter has proved, as it was intended to be a help and not an obsession to the reporting Officer.

The answers to the questionnaire will represent the frame-work of the final historical report on air raids on India and it is hoped that the questionnaire will help the reporting authorities at various stages to send all information they have, which will be of value an to exclude irrelevant information.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,

Lt.-Col.
Deputy Secretary to the Government of India

No.84/42-ARP (C.D).

Copy with a copy of the enclosure is forwarded to the Private Secretary to His Excellency the Viceroy,
General Staff Branch (M.I.)
All Departments of the Government of India

for information.

By order,

Lt.-Col.
Deputy Secretary to the Government of India.

Khan.24.

CONFIDENTIAL.

ANNEXURE
QUESTIONNAIRE.

1. AIR RAID WARNINGS.

(a) Time when Yellow warning was received.
(b) Time when Red warning was received.

The first Yellow Warning was received at 08.40 hours. The Red Warning was received at 09.40 hours.

Air Raid message green received at 12.25 hours. The second Red Warning was received at 13.37 hours.

Air Raid Message Green at 16.20 hours.

The third Red Warning was received at 20.13 hours.

(c) Time when Air Raid Alarm was sounded.

Air Raid Alarm was sounded in each case from between 30 to 40 seconds or less after receipt of the message.

(d) How much time elapsed between the sounding of the Air Raid Alarm and the actual arrival of raiders?

Generally speaking the air raid message Red was received from the Army authorities only when planes were actually overhead and the air raid alarm generally synchronised with the fall of bombs and anti-air craft fire.

(e) Was the Air Raid Alarm audible?

The wind was generally speaking favourable to audibility and the sirens were heard in almost all quarters in the town.

(f) Did the populace take cover?

A majority of the populace took cover though a certain number remained on the roofs as spectators during the first raid. During the subsequent raids the population took cover with more thoroughness.

(g) Did traffic get off the streets promptly?

Most of the traffic got off the streets immediately. Since the alarm was in force for fairly considerable periods few vehicles reappeared on the streets at the later stages when no raiders were actually in sight.

(H) Was there any obstruction of Air Raid Precautions Vehicles?

There was no obstruction to A.R.P. vehicles.

1. (Contd)

(i) How long after the warning was the all Clear sounded?

The All Clear was sounded 2 hours 45 minutes, 2 hours 43 minutes and 3 hours 18 minutes respectively after the various Air Raid Alarms.

(j) Were any bogus wireless or other messages received ?

No bogus messages appear to have been received by the A.R.P.

(k) Any other points ?

Air Raid Messages Green were sent by the Army authorities long after the raid and only very shortly before the re-appearance of enemy aircraft. After the first All Clear there was a general relaxation and assumption that all danger has passed which led to a tendency to relax all precautions forgetting that the Yellow still persisted.

(l) Suggestions.

It is suggested that some improved methods of spotting and reporting the approach of enemy aircraft should be instituted forthwith by the Army authorities in the immediate neighbourhood north of Vizagapatam. The receipt of Air Raid Message Red from the Army authorities was in both the afternoon raids belated. In the 13.37 hours raid the air raid message Red was received from the Military untilthe first wave of bombers was actually over the Port area dropping bombs. Had the Army observation and reporting system been more efficient it should have been possible to sound the sirens one or two minutes before the actual arrival of bombers.

OBSCURATION.

The obscuration appeared to be strictly observed during the night by the whole populace. Electric power was cut off in the middle of the night owing to the disappearance of the Power House personnel.

A.R.P. CONTROL ROOM.

(a) Did they function satisfactorily ?

(b) If not, in what respects did they fail ?

Control room functioned efficiently.

3. (c)/...

3. (contd)

(c) Was telephone communication satisfactory ?

Telephonic communication was fairly satisfactory although the behaviour of some of the Operators in the Telephone Exchange was unsatisfactory since certain personnel absented themselves and the work had to be carried on by a few Operators who stood fast. Telephonic communication with the Port was interrupted. One bomb blew down a number of telephone wires and in order to communicate with the Port a motor cycle Messenger had to be used. The absolute necessity for several motor cycle messengers being attached to the Control Rooms of the respective A.R.P. schemes in Vizagapatam was clearly demonstrated. Another motor cycle messenger was also utilised to convey urgent papers to the Telegraph Office.

(d) Was the Messenger service used and was it satisfactory ?

Yes.

(e) How long was the staff on duty and were reliefs necessary ?

The A.R.P. Control Room staff were on duty throughout the day and had to sleep at night in the rooms adjacent to the Control Centre. It was demonstrated that two full aid shifts for the Control Room re necessary since the strain nposed on one shift for long eriods was great. Some reliefs ere arranged by utilising office id instructional staff who form ie volunteer shift but these were ctually required for other duties .so, such as supervision of iergency feeding, compilation reports etc.

(f) Number of incidents reported.

Only one "incident" was reported. This consisted of the appearance of a casualty in Allipur. This casualty appears to have come from the Harbour. He was suffering from shock.

(g) Any other points.

In spite of the lack of air raid damage in the town itself a very large number of telephone calls were made to the Control Room by posts, enquirers after information, heads of Government Departments, Telegraph and Telephone Staff etc. The direct line system to various points with broadcasting switch apparatus under the direct control of the A.R.P. Controller was found to be a great help and of the utmost utility in distributing instructions and warnings rapidly.

3.(Contd.)

(g) The Observation Post built on the spur of King George Hospital and connected by the direct line telephone to the Control Centre was extremely useful in reporting the movements of planes and sometimes of bombing in the Port area.

(h) Suggestions, When a fuse of the lighting system failed the necessity for fans and artificial ventilation was clearly shown as well as the advisability of having a small emergency electric lighting plant. The heat of a number of oil lamps in the Control room was extremely oppressive. Further, minor structural modifications which have to be made to the Control Room to increase the strength of arches will result in a further reduction of such ventilation as exists already. The provision of a small emergency engine and dynamo both for providing emergency lighting and charging batteries is most necessary.

4. REPORT CENTRES. Nil.

5. AIR RAID WARDENS.

(a) Did they function satisfactorily ? The air raid wardens did not have to function as a reporting agency. The majority of the Volunteer Wardens failed to put in an appearance. A few volunteer Port Wardens turned up at their posts. The majority of the paid (staff) wardens appeared to have remained at their posts. The exact position as regards the number of absentees is under investigation by the Chief Warden who is compiling figures. His report is not yet ready.

6. CASUALTY SERVICES.

I. Fixed First Aid Posts.

(a) Did they function satisfactorily ? Yes.
(b) If not, in what respects did they fail ?
(c) Were there any casualties among the personnel ? No
(d) Were any First Aid Posts damaged by bombs ? No
(e) How many cases did they deal with ? One
(f) Of the number given in (e) how many did they send on to hospital ? One.
(g) How long were the staffs on duty and were reliefs necessary? Staff on duty according to the roster.
(h) Was the number sufficient ? Yes, on the occasion.
(i) Any other points. ? Nil.
(j) Suggestions. Nurses should be appointed immediately.

II. MOBILE FIRST AID POSTS. Not yet ready.

11f. ..ORTH FIRST AID PARTIES.

(a) did they function satisfactorily ? — Paid personnel on duty. 50% of volunteers only turned up.
(b) If not, in what respects did they fail ? — Only 50% of volunteers turned up.
(c) Were there any casualties among the personnel ? — No.
(d) Was any damage done to equipment through bombs or accident ? — No.
(e) How many cases did they deal with ? — One.
(f) Of the number given in (e) how many did they send to hospital ? — One.
(g) How long were these units on duty ? — Paid personnel did duty in shifts throughout the day.
(h) How many units were there and how many were used ?
(i) Was the number sufficient ? — Certain medical equipment lacking.
(j) Any other points. — Nil.
(k) Suggestions.

. AMBULANCE SERVICE.

(a) Did it function satisfactorily ? — Yes.
(b) If not, in what respects did they fail ? — ---
(c) Were there any casualties among the personnel. — No.
(d) Was there any damage done to equipment through bombs or accident ? — No.
(e) How many cases did it deal with ? — Port requisitioned an ambulance which was sent.
(f) How long was it at work ? — Till casualties were sent to hospital.
(g) How many ambulances were there..how many were used ? — Seven
(h) Was the number sufficient ? — Yes.
(i) Any other points ? — Nil.
(j) Suggestions. — Nil.

. RESCUE PARTIES. — Rescue parties nothing in the town.

. STREET FIRE PARTIES. — There were none of these and they had no opportunity to function. During the night a majority of the inhabitants appear to have left the place. Shops have have been closed and the owners have departed. Vizagapatam is more or less deserted and street fire party system would in any case have failed totally. In my opinion the organisation of an elaborate scheme of Street Fire Parties is almost completely a waste of time. It would be preferable if the number of water storage tanks and the strength of the Fire Brigade were increased in order to confine any major conflagration which might occur.

9. GAS IDENTIFICATION SERVICE. — Nil

10. GAS DECONTAMINATION SERVICE. — Nil.

page 6/.....

11. A.R.P. DEPOTS.

(a) Did they function satisfactorily ?

On the whole the A.R.P. Depot functioned satisfactorily. Very few First Aid Volunteer personnel appeared at the Depots and none of the Volunteer rescue party personnel appeared at all. The raids completely demonstrated the unreliability of volunteer personnel and the fact that no dependance can be placed on them.

(b) If not, in what respect did they fail ?

Vide (a) above.

(c) Any other points.

The necessity for cooking arrangement in Depots was already clearly demonstrated owing to the flight of shop-keepers and those running catering establishments in the town. Emergency feeding requires to be provided not merely for Depot Services but for paid Wardens etc. who are unable to buy food or obtain cooked meals.

12. FIRE BRIGADES AND TRAILER PUMP SQUADS.

(a) Did they function satisfactorily ?

The Fire Brigades were not called out.

(b) If not, in what respects did they fail ?

Certain off-duty firemen failed to report for duty in the Fire Station. One Driver was also absent.

(c) to (i)

Nil.

(j) Were the number of firemen and amount of pumps and equipment adequate ?

Only two pumps are available in Vizagapatam. There are three tenders. This is totally inadequate.

(k) Was the water supply adequate?

The high level town service reservoir was not kept filled by the Municipality. This tank contains 75,000 gallons of water and requires to be kept filled at all times in order to produce some pressure in the mains.

(l) to (p)

Nil.

(q) Any other points

The necessity for having firemen residence adjacent to the Fire Station was demonstrated. The feeding of firemen and drivers was also necessary. They were fed at the nearest A.R.P. Depot, and their own messing is being arranged. A temporary mess room has been provided. Some Firemen who were away off duty could not be found and failed to turn up as already mentioned above.

MOBILE REPAIR UNITS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES AND FOR MAINTENANCE OF VITAL SERVICES SUCH AS COMMUNICATIONS? WATER SUPPLY, DRAINAGE, ETC.

Not used because all damage was in Port area.

page 7/....

14. HOSPITALS.

(a) Did they function satisfactorily ?	Yes.
(b) If not, in what respects did they fail.	Nil.
(c) Were there any casualties among the personnel ?	No.
(d) Were any Hospitals damaged by bombs ?	No.
(e) How many beds were ready to receive casualties at the time the raid started ?	52 Beds: 103 Beds on floor. Total 160.
(f) How many wounded persons admitted to hospital were discharged after 1 week.	19. None discharged. 2 absconded.
(g) How many died after admission ?	No deaths.
(h) Was there any difficulty in disposing of dead bodies.	No.
(i) was the number of beds and the amount of equipment adequate ?	Yes.
(j) How long was it before all operations were completed ?	Immediate attention was given.
(k) Any other points:	Light cut off in the new out-patient block owing to failure of power house.
(l) Suggestions.	Nil.

15. CORPSE DISPOSAL ORGANISATION.

Does not exist.

16. SALVAGE ORGANIZATION, INCLUDING DEMOLITION AND CLEARANCE OF DEBRIS.

No occasion to use this.

17. FEEDING SERVICES.

(a) Stocks of food had already been purchased and about 200 persons were fed in the evening on receipt of the final air raid Message 'Green'. This included the Fire Brigade and the A.R.P. Services. Food was un-obtainable in the town for many. It is understood that some considerable inconvenience was experienced by the Police who had not yet perfected emergency feeding arrangements - Telephone and Telegraph personnel have to be fed.

(b) It was seen that food could be cooked centrally but required to be distributed in a motor vehicle or vehicles to outlying portions of the town where A.R.P. Personnel were stationed e.g. First Aid Posts and Wardens Posts.

(c) The necessity for canteen vans was demonstrated and these should be provided. Provision of hot tea to Control, Depot and other staff after long periods of waiting under tension while raids were in progress had a very beneficial effect.

page 8/...

18. REINFORCEMENTS.

(a) (a) It was ascertained from the Port A.R.P. Controller by means of a motor cycle Messenger that he required one Ambulance This was despatched to the Port and removed casualties to Hospital.

(b) (b) No difficulty was experienced in the arrangement.

(c) and (d) Nil.

19. CARE OF HOMELESS.

No homeless. No damage in town.

20. EVACUATION.

(a) About what numbers joined in the evacuation ? — No evacuation till last night when abput 10,000 people left.

(b) Was it mostly on foot and along what roads ? — Mostly on foot along Pendurti road.

(c) How much was by railway and along what lines ? — None by railway as trains did not run.

(d) Extent to which panic evacuation was checked and people began to return. — There was no panic. People are not yet returning.

(e) Did any pre-arranged schemes work according to plan ? — Two food depots have been opened with stores already bought by Government and stored in a central depot. Steps are being taken to open some more depots to sell food stuffs comandeered under the Defence of India Rules.

(f) If not what respects did they fail ? — All the merchants ran away and left their shops locked.

21. NATURE OF ATTACK.

(i) Air craft approached from the North-east in most cases and in one case from East North East.

(ii) Bombers generally came in waves of five and sometimes three. There was no Fighter escort.

(iii) Bombers generally approached in two waves.

(iv) The first raids appear to have been made at a low height of about 2 to 4 thousand feet. The last raid in the evening appears to have been made at a height of between 8 and 10 thousand feet.

(v) Estimates of the number of bombs actually dropped vary considerably since a number appear to have been dropped, in water. Some 20 to 225 bombs would appear to have been dropped.

(vi) Incidents were confined to the Port area.

page 9/ (vii)

21. (contd)

(vii) Only H.E. bombs appear to have been dropped. They appear to have been of about 250 lbs. So far as is known no delayed action bombs were dropped.

(ii) There are no reports of any machine-gunning.

(ix) Not known.

(x) One of our aircraft was in the air in the morning. It is not known whether this sustained any damage.

(xi) to xix. Nil so far as is known.

22. PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES AGAINST WHICH ATTACK APPARENTLY DIRECTED.

Power house and ships in Harbour.

23. EXTENT TO WHICH APPARENT OBJECT OF ATTACK WAS ACHIEVED.

Not, achieved, though very near misses.

24. CASUALTIES.

What was the number (gas casualties separately)

(a) Killed	5 Killed. All in underground shelter.
(b) Injured and admitted to hospital.	19 injured. Mostly in underground shelter.
(c) Injured and not admitted to hospital.	Nil.
(d) Missing.	Unknown.
(e) Total	24.

25. MORALE.

(i)

Behaviour of the general public during the first air raid was fairly satisfactory. There was no panic and people took cover. At intervals between the first All Clear and the succeeding Air Raid warning a certain number of people walked out of the town. During the night a very large number of people left Vizagapatam. At least 10,000 would appear to have left and in the morning the city presents a completely deserted appearance. The owners of shops closed and padlocked their shops and left. One or two tea shops are open but only a skeleton of the original population remains.

Police. - A tour of the Harbour area disclosed that there were no Special Emergency Force sentries visible at any point in the Port. A few of the staff of the Harbour Police Station were to be seen. The Port was deserted and there was nobody to be seen in any of the offices. It is believed that

page 10/.....

23.
(ii)(contd) that the behaviour of the Reserve Police Force is satisfactory.

(iii) A.R.P. SERVICES. On the whole the paid personnel behaved well. There are a few instances of off-duty personnel putting in a slightly delayed appearance. All however except one driver were present during the raid. In the evening after the final All Clear one Rescue Party Deputy Leader and the P.W.D. Supervisor/Specialist Instructor in charge of Rescue Parties disappeared, as well as the Chief Instructor. They have failed to report on the 7th so far. Two recently posted clerks who have only been in the A.R.P. Office for a short time have absented themselves. They are both Revenue Department personnel. A clerk and a Storeman of No.2 Depot have disappeared. From such information as is available at present 8 or 10 Staff Wardens appear to have disappeared and about half a dozen messengers (paid) would also appear to have vanished. At least 50 % of the honorary Wardens have disappeared and at least 50 % or more of the Honorary Post Wardens are missing.

(iv) Fire Brigade.- As already reported one Driver and four off-duty Constables failed to put in an appearance. The morale of the remaining firemen is fairly satisfactory.

(v) Hospital staff. The menial staff appears to have disappeared and a certain number of Ward Boys etc. have absconded.

(vi) Public Utility concerns. The staff of the Government Power House absconded for a time, no power has been available. Volunteers had to be obtained to stoke the Power House boilers. A single Switch Board Operator remained in the Electric Corporation building. All Repair Gangs etc. disappeared

(vii) Government servants. It is understood that a very large number of clerks in the Government offices have disappeared.
(a) The municipal Commissioner could not be found, in the Municipal Office while raids were in progress throughout the 6th. No response could be obtained from the Municipal Office telephone or from the bungalow of the Municipal Health Officer.

(b) The staff of the Sewage Farm was absent throughout the day. The only person present in the Sewage Farm was the Staff Warden since this is also an A.R.P. Post.

(c) All Municipal labour disappeared. The Sewage Farm was deserted and no water Repair Gang is available. The Water Works staff are not to be found except for a chowkidar in the Waltair Uplands Reservoir and an Electrician in the Pumping Station. Whether any these were also present during the actual raids is doubtful.

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23. (contd)

(ix) Railways

(i) It is understood that Ticket Collectors and other such staff in the Railway stations have disappeared.

(ii) Almost all engine drivers appear to have disappeared. A certain number of the European employees were driving trains.

(x) Ports.

(i) Port Staff except for European personnel appear to have absconded completely, with the exception of one or two Port A.R.P. Staff.

(ii) Dock labour is not to be seen.

(iii) Crew of the vessels left the vessels in some cases while raids were in progress. In the case of one ship containing explosive, this was understandable.

(xi) Educational institutions.

No information available.

(xii) Domestic servants.

A large number of domestic servants appear to have disappeared and almost all paid motor car drivers have absconded.

(xiii) Factory Labour. The Port workshops was deserted.

(xiv) The majority of unorganised labour has almost completely disappeared.

(xv) Taxis. Busses are not to be seen in Vizagapatam. It is said that Military pickets are stopping them on the outskirts of the town.

(xvi) Almost all the shop keepers have locked their shops and left,

(xvii) Very large number of the clerical staffs in business houses have disappeared.

The Agent of the Imperial Bank was carrying out the entire work of his bank assisted only by one Cashier.

(xviii) During actual raids there was no panic but in general at nights after the All Clear had been sounded the population showed a determination to leave Vizagapatam. In the case of labour Organised labour camps on the outskirts of Vizagapatam to villages. A certain amount of the movement may be due to an anxiety to remove women and children to places of safety and when this movement is completed there is a possibility of a certain number

pg12/...

25.(contd)
(xviii)

returning to the city. This is unlikely to take place for several days.

(b) (a) No steps were taken by the A.R.P. to inform the public of the facts since there was scarcely any public to inform.

(b) Public in general obeyed the orders and instructions issued by the authorities.

(d) (c) It is doubtful whether further propaganda would achieve much useful purpose.

(e) (d) There is no local Press.

(f) (e) Nil.

26. EFFECTS OF RAID ON THE A.R.P. SERVICES Civil Guards. Police etc.

27. CRIME DURING AND AFTER RAID ESPECIALLY LOOTING. — No looting during raid but on the 8th morning N.M.S. Bakery was looted. The police have arrested some culprits.

28. FIFTH COLUMN ACTIVITIES AND ESPECIALLY THOSE OF THE TERRORIST GROUPS. — Nothing known yet.

29. WORKING OF CIVIC GUARDS, POLICE AND POLICE ARRANGEMENTS. — Police arrangements good.

30. DAMAGE CAUSED.

(i) General survey	Damage to Port workshops and roads in port area.
(ii) Particulars of serious damage to important buildings, munitions factories; Docks, ships railways, and rolling stock, bridges and industrial concerns.	Nil.
(iii) Effect of damage on production of war material.	Nil.
(iv) When is full production expected to be restored.	Not known.

1. COMMUNICATIONS.

(i) Roads.	No effect.
(ii) Railways.	Impeded owing to desertion of staff.
(iii) Telephones	Not affected. Worked well.
(iv) Telegraphs	do.
(v) Posts	do
(vi) Ports and Shipping	Seriously affected. No labour available in Port.

32. WORKING OF TELEPHONE SYSTEM DURING RAID.

(a) Did it receive and transmit the warning efficiently ? — Yes.

(b) Apart from interruption due to destruction of plant by bombs did it function satisfactorily? — Yes.

(c) If not, in what respects did it fail;

(d) Did the staffs at the Exchange stick ato their posts ? — Yes.

(e) Were the wires contested with messages. — Yes.

(f) What damage was done by bombs ? — Wires in the Port area were all damaged.

(g) Any other points. — --

(h) Suggestions — --

33. WATER SUPPLY.

(1) DRINKING WATER.

(a) Was this affected? — No.

(b) Was there an alternative system and did this work satisfactorily. — Alternative system of ... not use

(c) Suggestions. — --

(2) UNFILTERED WATER SUPPLY.

(a) Was this affected ? — N
(b) What was the result ? — --
(c) Suggestions — Nil

34. COAL GAS. — o Gas.

35. ELECTRICITY.

(a) Was any damage caused to the electric supply arrangements ? — --

(b) If so, was the result serious. — No damage but power house did not function for about 9 hour-

(c) Suggestions. — -

36. CONSERVANCY AND SANITATION.

(a) Did this continue to function ? — No.
(b) If not, what was the resul — --
(c) Suggestions.

37. EPIDEMICS.

(a) — No.

38. SHELTERS AND SLIT TRENCHES.

(a) The public in general took shelter in their own houses or in whatever houses were available. Little use appears to have been made of slit trenches. The Verandah A.R.P. shelters were used.

(b) No air raid damage was experienced in Vizagapatam town itself. Hence the protection afforded was not tested.

(c) Nil

(d) Nil.

(e) Additional verandah shelters in the congested portions of the town would be advisable

39. ANIMALS. Nil.

40. MAINTENANCE OF FOOD SUPPLIES. Food is being supplied from two depots. All suppliers have left.

41. EFFECTS OF RAID ON PRICES AND MARKETS. Report will follow.

42. WORKING OF CIVIL DEFENCE INFORMATION BUREAUS. --

43. WERE THE GENERAL PREPARATIONS MADE INADEQUATE IN ANY RESPECT ? Not inadequate.

44. LIAISON AND CO-OPERATION BETWEEN CIVIL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES. Good.

45. EMERGENCY ADMINISTRATION

(a) Was any use made by District Magistrates, etc, of the special emergency powers Under the Defence of India Rules with which they have been vested ? Details will follow.

(b) Are any extra powers needed. -do-

46. PUBLIC OPINION. Details will follow.

bid.

SECRET.

No. 84/42-ARP (C.D.),

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
CIVIL DEFENCE DEPARTMENT.

From

A.W.Ibbotson Esqr:,CIE.,LBE.,MC.,ICS.,
Secretary to the Government of India.

To

All Chief Secretaries, and
Chief Commissioners.

CIVIL DEFENCE DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO.208/42.

Subject:- Raids on Vizagapetam Port.

New Delhi. Dated May 9th 1942.

Sir,

I am directed to send herewith a note on the Japanese Raids on Vizagapatam Port on April 6th, 1942.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,

A W Ibbotson

SECRETARY.

Encl:- one.

No.84/42-ARP(C.D.),

Copy forwarded to the Private Secretary to His Excellency the Viceroy, General Staff Branch (M.I.), all Departments of the Government of India for information in continuation of the Civil Defence Department letter No.84/42-ARP(C.D.) dated 27th April, 1942.

S E C R E T.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

The two Japanese Air Raids on Vizagapatam Port at 1337 hours and 1655 hours on 6th April were miserably weak affairs, but the results of them stressed very clearly the lessons that were indicated in Rangoon.

1. The A.R.P. forces that were in two large depots, under full time pay, constant discipline and training and with rations available were the only body of men who all stayed and carried on as a body.

2. Although not a bomb was dropped on the city and only some 25 on the docks a mile away, (the main raid was cut at sea) the population of the city fell from 75000 to about 25000 in the days before the raid on the scare that Japanese forces were about, and from 25,000 to little over 2000 on the evening of the raids.

On the evening of the 6th about 15000 remained and on the 7th about two to three thousand. Number had risen on the 18th to five to seven thousand.

There was no question of bringing in troops along the roads used by this exodus, but the difficulties can be imagined had such a necessity arisen.

3. The casualties on land were seven killed and about a dozen injured. Unfortunately there was one direct hit on a shelter near the docks which accounted for all the seven deaths.

4. There was, as in Rangoon, no screaming panic during the raid, but the same numbness. Both before and after them people put down their heads and went.

5. The essential labour both of the municipality and the power house, went, and most of the directing staff. Bombs straddled the power house, but did not damage it. The walls of the Harbour Workshop were slightly cracked and a small store was demolished.

But Mr. Lazarus, Divisional Electrical Engineer, the head of the Power House, worked heroically for 16 hours with one faithful assistant, doing the stoking himself.

And the Congress Chairman of the Municipality stayed and was constantly about, and very angry with his subordinates when some of them trickled back.

6. After the raid no food was on sale in the city for 4 days, as all the banias and eating house keepers had locked their doors and gone. A very few opened on the 10th April.

The District Magistrate broke open shops, commandeered stocks, and established eating depots, getting in cooks from the countryside through his tahsildars.

7. The Special Emergency Police lost 49 of their men by flight, a few of the Regular Police also went but exact details are not known.

The Civic Guards went.

8. Some of the male nursing staff from hospitals left, but sufficient staff to carry on remained. Only 3 out of 48 sweepers stayed.

9. Some of the P. & T. Staff went, but sufficient remained to carry on with difficulty. A set of telephone lines connecting the Port with the Town were damaged by one bomb and the need of a good messenger service was emphasized.

10. While senior officers very rightly went out to help, there was difficulty because their telephones were not manned and they could not find each other.

Reliable deputies should be left at telephones and should be kept informed of the whereabouts of officers.

In Burma morning and evening meetings were found of value.

For those connected with the town itself the Control Room should be made every use of as a clearing house and meeting place.

11. The presence in a raided town of direct representatives of the Government of the Province with powers at least to make immediate and authoritative recommendations and in smaller cases, grants of rewards for gallantry is of great importance.

It is equally important that from now onwards all officers should constantly move about among their subordinates, cheer them up, and raise morale.

The conclusions to be drawn are .

Discipline, leadership and esprit de corps in large depots situated away from likely target areas, are the best and probably only way of keeping A.R.P. Services together.

Food and fuel at their posts is the next greatest need.

The District Magistrate becomes temporary dictator and must be prepared to do so.

Arrangements to shepherd the crowd of refugees, which cannot be stopped, are essential.

A good messenger service is essential.

Repair services for essentials such as P. & T. lines, water mains and so forth are essential with necessary stores.

A W Shotter

Secretary, C.D. Department.
Government of India.

NEW DELHI.
May 8, 1942.

2281/W.

SECRET.

THE OFFICE OF THE HON'BLE THE RESIDENT IN MYSORE,

Dated Bangalore, the 5th June 1942.

No.F.3(15)-42/W.

A copy of the undermentioned papers is forwarded with compliments to the -

Chief Secretary to the Government of
His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore,
Bangalore,

for information, in continuation of endorsement from this Residency No.F.3(15)-42/W, dated the 2nd June 1942.

5. JUN. 1942 GOVT. OF MYSORE.

By order, etc.,

For SECRETARY TO THE RESIDENT.

- - - -

The Government of India, Civil Defence Department letters to all Provincial Governments, etc. No.390/41-ARP(C.D.), dated the 18th and the 22nd May 1942.

Copy of a letter from the Government of India, Civil Defence Department, to all Provincial Governments, etc. No.390/41-ARP(C.D.), dated the 18th May 1942.

----:O:----

CIVIL DEFENCE DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR No.220/42.

Reporting information regarding hostile attacks and their effects.

= = = =

390/41 The following points are brought to the Provincial Government's notice with regard to Civil Defence Department Circular No.74/42 of 19th February, 1942, on the subject of reporting information regarding hostile attacks and their effects: -

(1) The questionnaire attached to that letter was meant to be the servant and not the master of those required to furnish reports: it was intended to help them and not to be an obsession to them.

(2) It is not expected that replies to anything like all the items will be available when the earlier reports are sent.

The submission of the Immediate Report and the Preliminary Report should on no account be delayed on account of the absence of information on any of the points. Such information as is available must be sent.

(3) These reports are Confidential reports for official use only and have no connection with the communiques to be issued to the public which are dealt with in General Headquarters Most Secret letter No. 2201/G.S.I.(c) of 4th April 1942, which was forwarded to all Provincial Governments with Information and Broadcasting Department's letter No.19/1/42-A.&G. of 2nd May 1942.

The public communiques to be issued under General Headquarters' letter of 4th April, 1942, are: -

(i) Preliminary Communique) by the competent Military authority.
(ii) Military Communique)
(iii) Press Note - by the Civil authorities.

(4) When the Immediate report covering both Civil and Military items (vide paragraph 7(i) of Civil Defence Department Circular No.74/42 of 19th February 1942) is submitted to General Headquarters a copy of it will be sent by the submitting officer to the Provincial Government concerned if he is in the Headquarters station of the Provincial Government. If he is not, he will repeat it to intermediate Military Commands and the appropriate Command which maintains touch with the Provincial Government will at once send them a copy. Instructions to this effect have been issued to all Military Commands and it will be for the Provincial Government concerned to make the necessary representation to the appropriate Command if they do not receive a copy of the Immediate report.

(5) The Government of India consider that reports by Military authorities on Civil items should only be made after consultation with the appropriate Civil authorities whenever this is possible and will not lead to undue delay. Instructions to this effect will be issued to all Military Commands.

(6) Item 37(a) of the Questionnaire "Did any epidemics break out?" was marked as a Military Immediate item so that General Headquarters can take the necessary precautions if they decide to move troops into the area. The existence of any existing epidemics should, therefore, be reported under this item.

(7) The intention in paragraph 3(ii) of Civil Defence Department Circular No.74/42 is that local Posts, Telegraphs, Railway, Ports and Civil Aviation officials should submit breakdown reports direct to the appropriate Department of the Government of India and not that this should

should devolve on the Provincial Government.

----:0:----

Copy of a letter from the Government of India, Civil Defence Department, to all Provincial Governments, No.390/41(ARP) (C.D.), dated the 22nd May 1942.

C.D.D. CIRCULAR No.227/42.
Reports of Air Raids.

I am directed to refer to paragraph 8 of Civil Defence Department Circular No.74/42, dated the 19th February 1942 and to request that the date the report was despatched from the office of origin be always noted thereon.

----:0:----

SECRET.

GOVERNMENT OF HIS HIGHNESS THE MAHARAJA OF MYSORE.

No. 2-11/W.Encls. W 91-41-16.

General and Revenue Secretariat,

*Dated Bangalore,...*1st....July.....*1942*.

FROM

Chief
The Secretary to the Government of
His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore.

To

The I.G.P.
The District Magistrates of Districts.

SIR,

Collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects.

- - - -

In continuation of this office letter No.2194-2202/W dated the 27th March 1942 on the above subject, I am directed to forward for your information and guidance, copies of Government of India, Civil Defence Department Circular letters Nos.190/42, 208/42 and 390/41-A.R.P.(C.D.) dated the 27th April, 9th May and 18th May, 1942, respectively, together with copies of answers to questionnaire, regarding air raids on Visagapatam.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,

Per Chief Secretary to Government.

SECRET.

Copy of letter No.84/42-A.R.P.(C.D.), dated the 9th May 1942 from the Government of India, Civil Defence Department, to all Chief Secretaries and Chief Commissioners.

Civil Defence Department Circular No.208/42.

Subject:- Raids on Vizagapatam Port.

I am directed to send herewith a note on the Japanese Raids on Vizagapatam Port on April 6th, 1942.

The two Japanese Air Raids on Vizagapatam Port at 1337 hours and 1655 hours on 6th April were eleventh hour affairs, but the results of them stressed very clearly the lessons that were indicated in Rangoon.

1. The A.R.P. forces that were in the large depots, under full time pay, constant discipline and training and with rations available were the only body of men who all stayed and carried on as a body.

2. Although not a bomb was dropped on the city and only some 25 on the docks a mile away, (the main raid was out at sea) the population of the city fell from 79000 to about 25000 in the days before the raid on the scare that Japanese forces were about, and from 25,000 to little over 7000 on the evening of the raids.

On the evening of the 6th about 15000 remained and on the 7th about two to three thousand. Number had risen on the 13th to five to seven thousand.

There was no question of bringing in troops along the roads used by this exodus, but the difficulties can be imagined had such a necessity arisen.

3. The casualties on land were seven killed and about a dozen injured. Unfortunately there was one direct hit on a shelter near the docks which accounted for all the seven deaths.

4. There was, as in Rangoon, no screaming panic during the raid, but the same muddness. Both before and after them people put down their heads and went.

5. The essential labour both of the Municipality and the power house, dock, and most of the dressing staff. Bombs straddled the power house, but did not damage it. The walls of the Harbour Workshop were slightly cracked and a small floor was demolished.

But Mr. Pearce, Divisional Electrical Engineer, the head of the Power House, worked heroically for 18 hours with one faithful assistant, doing the main choking himself.

And the Congress Chairman of the Municipality stayed and was constantly about, and very angry with his subordinates when some of them trickled back.

6. After the raid no food was on sale in the city for 4 days, as all the Banias and eating house keepers had locked their doors and gone. A very few opened on the 10th April.

The District Magistrate broke open shops, commandeered stocks, and established eating depots, getting in cooks from the country-side through his tahsildars.

7. The Special Emergency Police lost 49 of their men by flight, a few of the Regular Police also went but exact details are not known.

The Civic Guards went.

8. Some of the male nursing staff from hospitals left, but sufficient staff to carry on remained. Only 3 out of 48 sweepers stayed.

9. Some of the P. & T. Staff went, but sufficient remained to carry on with difficulty. A set of telephone lines connecting the Fort with the Town were damaged by one bomb and the need of a good messenger service was emphasised.

10. While senior officers very rightly went out to help, there was difficulty because their telephones were not manned and they could not find each other.

Reliable deputies should be left at telephones and should be kept informed of the whereabouts of officers.

In Burma morning and evening meetings were found of value.

For those connected with the town itself the Control Room should be made every use of as a clearing house and meeting place.

11. The presence in a raided town of direct representatives of the Government of the Province with powers at least to make immediate and authoritative recommendations and in smaller cases, grants of rewards for gallantry is of great importance.

It is equally important that from now onwards all officers should constantly move about among their subordinates, cheer them up, and raise morale.

The conclusions to be drawn are -

A. Discipline, leadership and esprit de corps in large depots situated away from likely target areas, are the best and probably only way of keeping A.R.P. Services together. Food and fuel at their posts is the next greatest need.

B. The District Magistrate becomes temporary dictator and must be prepared to do so.

C. Arrangements to shepherd the crown of refugees, which cannot be stopped, are essential.

D. A good messenger service is essential.

E. Repair services for essentials such as P. & T. lines, Water Mains and so forth are essential with necessary stores.

Copy of letter No.84/42-A.R.P.(C.D.), dated the 27th April 1942 from the Government of India, Civil Defence Department, to all Provincial Govts. and Chief Commissioners.

- - - -

Civil Defence Department Circular No.190/42.

Subject:- Report on air raids on Vizagapatam.

- - - - -

With reference to this Department's letter No.390/41-A.R.P.(C.D.) dated the 19th February, 1942, on the subject of reporting information regarding hostile attacks and their effects, I am directed to forward herewith the report on the air raids on Vizagapatam received from the Govt. of Madras.

2. The value of the report is apparent and it is clear that the questionnaire forwarded with the above letter has proved, as it was intended to be a help and not an obsession to the reporting officer.

The answers to the questionnaire will represent the frame-work of the final historical report on air raids on India and it is hoped that the questionnaire will help the reporting authorities at various stages to send all information they have, which will be of value and to exclude irrelevant information.

Answers to questionnaire.

1. AIR RAID WARNINGS:

(a) - The first Yellow Warning was received at 08.40 hours.

(b) - The Red Warning was received at 09.40 hours. Air Raid Message Green received at 12.25 hours. The second Red Warning was received at 13.37 hours. Air Raid Message Green at 16.20 hours. The third Red Warning was received at 20.13 hours.

(c) - Air Raid Alarm was sounded in each case from between 30 to 40 seconds or less after receipt of the message.

(d)-Generally speaking the air raid message Red was received from the Army authorities only when planes were actually overhead and the air raid alarm generally synchronised with the fall of bombs and anti-air craft fire.

(e) - The wind was generally speaking favourable to audibility and the sirens were heard in almost all quarters in the town.

(f) - A majority of the populace took cover though a certain number remained on the roofs as spectators during the first raid. During the subsequent raids the population took cover with more thoroughness.

(g) - Most of the traffic got off the streets immediately. Since the alarm was in force for fairly considerable periods few vehicles reappeared on the streets at the later stages when no raiders were actually in sight.

(h) - There was no obstruction to A.R.P. vehicles.

(i) - The all Clear was sounded 2 hours 45 minutes, 2 hours 43 minutes and 2 hours 13 minutes respectively after the various Air Raid Alarms.

(j) - No bogus messages appear to have been received by the A.R.P.

(k) - Air Raid Messages Green were sent by the Army authorities long after the raid and only very shortly before the re-appearance of enemy aircraft. After the first all Clear there was a general relaxation and assumption that all danger had passed which led to a tendency to entirely relax all precautions forgetting that the Yellow still persisted.

(l) - It is suggested that some improved methods of spotting and reporting the approach of enemy aircraft should be established forthwith by the Army authorities in the immediate neighbourhood north of Vizagapatam. The receipt of Air Raid Message Red from the Army authorities was in both the afternoon raids belated. In the 13.37 hours raid the air raid message Red was received from the Military until the first wave of bombers was actually over the Port area dropping bombs. Had the Army observation and reporting system been more efficient it should have been possible to sound the sirens one or two minutes before the actual arrival of bombers.

2. OBSCURATION:

The obscuration appeared to be strictly observed during the nights by the whole populace. Electric power was cut off in the middle of the night owing to the disappearance of the Power House personnel.

3. A.R.P. CONTROL ROOM:

(a) - Control room functioned efficiently.

(b) - -

(c) - Telephonic communication was fairly satisfactory although the behaviour of some of the Operators in the Telephone Exchange was unsatisfactory since certain personnel absented themselves and the work had to be carried on by a few Operators who stood fast. Telephonic communication with the Fort was interrupted. One bomb blew down a number of telephone wires and in order to communicate with the Fort a motor cycle Messenger had to be used. The absolute necessity for several motor cycle messengers being attached to the Control Rooms of the respective A.R.P. schemes in Vizagapatam was clearly demonstrated. Another motor cycle messenger was also utilised to convey urgent papers to the Telegraph Office.

(d) - Yes.

(e) - The A.R.P. Control Room staff were on duty throughout the day and had to sleep at night in the rooms adjacent to the Control Centre. It was demonstrated that two full paid shifts for the Control Room are necessary since the strain imposed on one shift for long periods was great. Some reliefs were arranged by utilising office and instructional staff who form the volunteer shift but these were normally required for other duties also, such as supervision of emergency feeding, compilation of reports etc.

(f) - Only one "incident" was reported. This consisted of the appearance of a casualty in Elliptur. This casualty appears to have come from the Harbour. He was suffering from shock.

(g) - In spite of the lack of air raid damage in the town itself a very large number of telephone calls were made to the Control Room by posts, enquirers after information, heads of Govt. Depts., Telegraph and Telephone Staff etc. The direct line system to various points with broadcasting switch apparatus under the direct control of the A.R.P. Controller was found to be a great help and of

the utmost utility in distributing instructions and warnings rapidly. The observation Post built on the spur of King George Hospital and connected by the direct line telephone to the Control Centre was extremely useful in reporting the movements of planes and sometimes of bombing in the Port Area.

(h) - When a fuse of the lighting system failed the necessity for fans and artificial ventilation was clearly shown as well as the advisability of having a small emergency electric lighting plant. The heat of a number of oil lamps in the Control Room was extremely oppressive. Further, minor structural modifications which have to be made to the Control Room to increase the strength of arches will result in a further reduction of such ventilation as exists already. The provision of a small emergency engine and dynamo both for providing emergency lighting and charging batteries is most necessary.

4. REPORT CENTRES: - Nil

5. AIR RAID WARDENS:

(a) - The air raid wardens did not have to function as a reporting agency. The majority of the Volunteer Wardens failed to put in an appearance. A few volunteer Port Wardens turned up at their posts. The majority of the paid (staff wardens appeared to have remained at their posts. The exact position as regards the number of absentees is under investigation by the Chief Warden who is compiling figures. His report is not yet ready.

6. CASUALTY SERVICES:

I. Fixed First Aid Posts.

(a) - Yes.
(b) - -
(c) - No.
(d) - No.
(e) - One.
(f) - One.
(g) - Staff on duty according to the roster.
(h) - Yes, on the occasion.
(i) - Nil.
(j) - Nurses should be appointed immediately.

II. Mobile First Aid Posts. - Not yet ready.

III. Mobile First Aid Parties:

(a) - Paid personnel on duty, 50% of volunteers only turned up.
(b) - Only 50% of volunteers turned up.
(c) - No.
(d) - No.
(e) - One.
(f) - One.
(g) - Paid personnel did duty in shifts throughout the day.
(h) - -
(i) - -
(j) - Certain medical equipment lacking.
(k) - Nil.

IV. Ambulance Service:

(a) - Yes.
(b) - -
(c) - No.
(d) - No.
(e) - Port requisitioned an ambulance which was sent.
(f) - Till casualties were sent to hospital.
(g) - Seven.
(h) - Yes.
(i) - Nil.
(j) - Nil.

7. RESCUE PARTIES: - Rescue parties nothing in the town.

8. STREET FIRE PARTIES:- There were none of these and they had no opportunity to function. During the night a majority of the inhabitants appear to have left the place. Shops have been closed and the owners have departed. Vizagapatam is more or less deserted and street fire party system would in any case have failed totally. In my opinion the organisation of unelaborate schems of Street Fire Parties is almost completely a waste of time. It would be preferable if the number of water storage tanks and the strength of the Fire Brigade were increased in order to confine any major conflagration which might occur.

9. GAS IDENTIFICATION SERVICE: - Nil.

10. GAS DECONTAMINATION SERVICE: - Nil.

11. A.R.P. DEPOTS:

(a) - On the whole the A.R.P. Depot functioned satisfactorily. Very few First Aid Volunteer personnel appeared at the Depots and some of the Volunteer rescue party personnel appeared at all. The raids completely demonstrated the unreliability of volunteer personnel and the fact that no dependance can be placed on them.

(b) - Vide (a) above.

(c) - The necessity for cooking arrangements in Depots was already clearly demonstrated owing to the flight of shop keepers and those running catering establishments in the town. Emergency feeding requires to be provided not merely for Depot Services but for paid Workers etc. who are unable to buy food or obtain cooked meals.

12. FIRE BRIGADES AND TRAILER PUMP UNITS.

(a) - The Fire Brigades were not called out.

(b) - Certain off-duty firemen failed to report for duty in the Fire Station. One Driver was also absent.

(c) to (i) - Nil.

(j) - Only two pumps are available in Vizagapatam. There are three tenders. This is totally inadequate.

(k) - The high level town service reservoir was not kept filled by the Municipality. This tank contains 75,000 gallons of water and requires to be kept filled at all times

in order to produce some pressure in the mains.

(l) to (p) - Nil.

(q) - The necessity for having firemen residence adjacent to the Fire Station was demonstrated. The feeding of firemen and drivers was also necessary. They were fed at the nearest A.F.S. Depot, and their own messing is being arranged. A temporary mess room has been provided. Some Firemen who were away off duty could not be found and failed to turn up as already mentioned above.

13. MOBILE REPAIR UNITS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES AND FOR MAINTENANCE OF VITAL SERVICES SUCH AS COMMUNICATIONS, WATER SUPPLY, DRAINS DRAINAGE, ETC:-

Not used because all damage was in Part

14. HOSPITALS:

(a) - Yes.

(b) - Nil.

(c) - No.

(d) - No.

(e) - 52 Beds: 108 Beds on floor - Total 160.

(f) - 19, None discharged - 2 absconded

(g) - No deaths.

(h) - None No.

(i) - Immediate attention was given.

(j) - Immediate attention was given.

(k) - Light cut off in the new out-patient block owing to failure of power house.

(l) - Nil.

15. CORPSE DISPOSAL ORGANISATION.- Does not exist.

16. SALVAGE ORGANISATION, INCLUDING DEMOLITION AND CLEARANCE OF DEBRIS. - No occasion to use this.

17. FEEDING SERVICES:

(a) Stocks of food had already been purchased and about 200 persons were fed in the evening on receipt of the final air raid Message 'Cream" This included the Fire Brigade and the A.R.P. Services. Food was un-obtainable in the town for many. It is understood that some considerable inconvenience was experienced by the Police who had not yet perfected emergency feeding arrangements - Telephone and Telegraph personnel have to be fed.

(b) It was seen that food could be cooked centrally but required to be distributed in a motor vehicle or vehicles to outlying portions of the town where A.R.P. Personnel were stationed e.g., First Aid Posts and Warden Posts.

(c) The necessity for canteen vans was demonstrated and these should be provided. Provision of hot tea to Control, Depot and other staff after long periods of waiting under tension while raids were in progress had a very beneficial effect.

18. RELIEF MEASURES.

(a) - It was ascertained from the Port A.R.P. Controller by means of a motor cycle Messenger that he required one Ambulance. This was despatched to the Port and removed casualties to Hospital.

(b) - No difficulty was experienced in the arrangement.

(c) & (d) - Nil.

19. CARE OF HOMELESS:- No homeless. No damage in town.

20. EVACUATION:-

(a) - No evacuation till last night when about 10,000 people left.

(b) - Mostly on foot along Pondurti road.

(c) - None by railway as trains did not run.

(d) - There was no panic. People are not yet returning.

(e) - Two food depots have been opened with stores already bought by Govt. and stored in a central depot. Steps are being taken to open some more depots to sell food stuffs commandeered under the Defence of India Rules.

(f) - All the merchants ran away and left their shops locked.

21. NATURE OF ATTACK:

(i) - Air craft approached from the North-east in most cases and in one case from East North East.

(ii) - Bombers generally came in waves of five and sometimes three. There was no fighter escort.

(iii) - Bombers generally approached in two waves.

(iv) - The first raids appear to have been made at a low height of about 2 to 4 thousand feet. The last raid in the evening appears to have been made at a height of between 8 and 10 thousand feet.

(v) - Estimates of the number of bombs actually dropped vary considerably since a number appear to have been dropped in water. Some 20 to 225 bombs would appear to have been dropped.

(vi) - Incidents were confined to the Port Area.

(vii) - Only H.E. bombs appear to have been dropped. They appear to have been of about 250 lbs. So far as is known no delayed action bombs were dropped.

(viii) - There are no reports of any machine-gunning.

(ix) - No known.

(x) - One of our aircraft was in the air in the morning. It is not known whether this sustained any damage.

(xi) - To(xix) - Nil. So far as it is known.

22. PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES AGAINST WHICH ATTACK APPARENTLY DIRECTED:

- Power house and ships in Harbour.

23. EXTENT TO WHICH APPARENT OBJECT OF ATTACK WAS ACHIEVED:

- Not achieved, though very near misses.

24. CASUALTIES:

(a) - 5 killed. All in underground shelter.
(b) - 19 injured. Mostly in underground shelter.
(c) - Nil.

(d) - Unknown.

(e) - 24.

25. Remarks:

(a) (i) - Behaviour of the general public during the first air raid was fairly satisfactory. There was no panic and people took cover. At intervals between the first All Clear and the succeeding Air Raid warning a certain number of people walked out of the town. During the night a very large number of people left Visagapatnam. At least 10,000 would appear to have left and in the morning the city presents a completely deserted appearance. The owners of shops closed and padlocked their shops and left. One or two shops are open but only a skeleton of the original population remains.

(ii) - Police:- A tour of the Harbour area disclosed that there was no special emergency force anywhere visible at any point in the Port. A few of the staff of the Harbour Police Station were to be seen. The Port was deserted and there was nobody to be seen in any of the offices. It is believed that the behaviour of the Reserve Police Force is satisfactory.

(iii) - A.R.P. Services:- On the whole the said personnel behaved well. There was also a few instances of off-duty personnel getting in a slightly delayed appearance. All however except one driver were present during the raid. In the evening after the final All Clear one Records Deputy Leader and the P.T.I. Supervisor/Specialist Instructor in charge of Rescue Parties disappeared, as well as the Chief Instructor. They have failed to report on the 7th as far. Two recently posted clerks who have only been in the A.R.P. Office for a short time have absented themselves. They are both Revenue Dept. personnel. 1 clerk and 8 Storemen of No.2 Depot have disappeared. Even such information as is available at present 2 or 3 Chief Wardens appear to have disappeared and about half a dozen Messengers (paid) would also appear to have vanished. At least 50% of the Honorary Wardens have disappeared and at least 30% or more of the Honorary Post Wardens are missing.

(iv) - Fire Brigade:- As already reported one Driver and four off-duty Constables failed to put in an appearance. The morale of the remaining firemen is fairly satisfactory.

(v) - Hospital Staff:-The Medical staff appears to have disappeared and a certain number of Ward Boys etc. have absconded.

(vi) - Public Utility concerns:- The staff of the Govt. Power House denounced for a time, no power whatsoever has been available. Volunteers had to be obtained to stoke the Power House boilers. A single British Board Operator remained in the Electric Corporation building. All Repair Gangs etc. disappeared.

(vii) - Govt. servants:- It is understood that a very large number of clerks in the Govt. offices have disappeared.

(a) The Municipal Comnr. could not be found, in the Municipal Office while raids were in progress throughout the 6th. No response could be obtained from the Municipal Office telephone or from the

bungalow of the Municipal Health Officer.

(b) ~~nil~~ Nil

(b) The staff of the Sewage Farm was absent throughout the day. The only person present in the Sewage Farm was the Staff Warden since this is also an A.R.P. Post.

(c) All Municipal labour disappeared. The Sewage Farm was deserted and no water Repair Gang is available. The Water Works staff are not to be found except for a chowkidar in the Waltair Uplands Reservoir and an Electrician in the Pumping Station. Whether these were also present during the actual raids is doubtful.

(ix) - Railways:

(i) It is understood that Ticket Collectors and other such staff in the Railway stations have disappeared.

(ii) Almost all engine drivers appear to have disappeared. A certain number of the European employees were driving trains.

(x) - Ports:

(i) Port staff except for European personnel appear to have absconded completely, with the exception of one or two Port A.R.P. Staff.

(ii) Dock labour is not to be seen.

(iii) Crew of the vessels left the vessels in some cases while raids were in progress. In the case of one ship containing explosives, this was understandable.

(xi) - Educational institutions: No information available.

(xii) - Domestic servants:- A large number of domestic servants appear to have disappeared and almost all paid motor car drivers have absconded.

(xiii) - Factory Labour:- The Port Workshops was deserted.

(xiv) - The majority of unorganised labour has almost completely disappeared.

(xv) - Taxis:- Busses are not to be seen in Visagapatam. It is said that Military pickets are stopping them on the outskirts of the town.

(xvi) - Almost all the shop keepers have locked their shops and left.

(xvii) - Very large number of the clerical staffs in business houses have disappeared. The Agent of the Imperial Bank was carrying out the entire work of his bank assisted only be one Cashier.

(xviii) -

(xviii) - During actual raids there was no panic but in general at nights after the All Clear had been sounded the population showed a determination to leave Visagapatam. In the case of labour Organised Labour camps on the outskirts of Visagapatam to villages. A certain amount of the movement may be due to an anxiety to remove women and children to places of safety and when this movement is completed there is a possibility of a certain number returning to the city. This is unlikely to take place for several days.

(b) - No steps were taken by the A.R.P. to inform the public of the facts since there was scarcely any public to inform.

(c) - Public in general obeyed the orders and instructions issued by the authorities.

(d) - It is doubtful whether further propaganda would achieve much useful purpose.

(e) - There is no local Press.

(f) - Nil.

26. - Nil.

27. CRIME DURING AND AFTER RAID ESPECIALLY LOOTING:- No looting during raid but on the 8th morning M.N.S. Bakery was looted. The Police have arrested seven culprits.

28. FIFTH COLUMN ACTIVITIES AND ESPECIALLY AND ESPECIALLY THOSE OF THE TERRORIST GROUPS:- Nothing known yet.

29. WORKING OF CIVIC GUARDS, POLICE AND POLICE ARRANGEMENTS:- Police arrangements good.

30. DAMAGE CAUSED:

(i) - Damage to Port Workshops and roads in port area.

(ii) - Nil.

(iii) - Nil.

(iv) - Not known.

31. COMMUNICATIONS.

(i) - No effect.

(ii) - Impeded owing to desertion of staff.

(iii) - Not affected. Worked well.

(iv) - -do-

(v) - -do-

(vi) - Seriously affected. No labour available in Port.

32. WORKING OF TELEPHONE SYSTEM DURING RAID:

(a) - Yes.
(b) - Yes.
(c) - -
(d) - Yes.
(e) - Yes.
(f) - Wires in the Port Area well all damaged.
(g) - -
(h) - -

33. WATER SUPPLY:

(1) Drinking Water.

(a) - No.
(b) - Alternative system of wells not used.
(c) - -

(2) UNFILTERED WATER SUPPLY:

(a) - No.
(b) - Nil.
(c) - Nil.

34. COAL GAS: - No gas.

35. ELECTRICITY:

(a) - -

(b) - No damage but power house did not function for about 9 hrs.

(c) - -

36. CONSERVANCY AND SANITATION.

(a) - No.

(b) - -

(c) - -

37. EPIDEMICS.

(a) - No.

38. SHELTERS AND SLIT TRENCHES:

(a) - The public in general took shelter in their own houses or in whatever houses were available. Little use appears to have been made of slit trenches. The Verandah A.R.P. shelters were used.

(b) - No Air raid damage was experienced in Visagapatam town itself. Hence the protection afforded was not tested.

(c) - Nil.

(d) - Nil.

(e) - Additional verandah shelters in the congested portions of the town would be advisable.

39. ANIMALS.- Nil.

40. MAINTENANCE OF FOOD SUPPLIES:

Food is being supplied from two depots. All suppliers have left

41. EFFECTS OF RAID ON PRICES AND MARKETS.- Report will follow.

42. WORKING OF CIVIL DEFENCE INFORMATION BUREAUS. -

43. WERE THE GENERAL PREPARATIONS MADE INADEQUATE IN ANY RESPECT:

- Not inadequate.

44. LIAISON AND CO-OPERATION BETWEEN CIVIL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES:

- Good.

45. EMERGENCY ADMINISTRATION:

(a) - Details will follow.

(b) - -do-

46. PUBLIC OPINION: - Details will follow.

Copy of letter from the Govt. of India, Civil Defence Dept. to all Provincial Govts. etc., No.390/41-ARP(C.D.) dated the 18th May 1942.

- - -

CIVIL DEFENCE DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO.220/42.

Reporting information regarding hostile attacks and their effects.

- - -

The following points are brought to the Provincial Govts' notice with regard to Civil Defence Dept. Circular No.74/42 of 19th February 1942, on the subject of reporting information regarding hostile attacks and their effects:-

1. The questionnaire attached to that letter was meant to be the servant and not the master of those required to furnish reports; it was intended to help them and not to be an obsession to them.

2. It is not expected that replies to anything like all the items will be available when the earlier reports are sent.

The submission of the Immediate Report and the Preliminary Report should on no account be delayed on account of the absence of information on any of the points. Such information as is available must be sent.

3. These reports are Confidential reports for official use only and have no connection with the communiques to be issued to the public which are dealt with in General Headquarters Most Secret letter No.2201/G.S.1.(c) of 4th April 1942, which was forwarded to all Provincial Govts. with information and Broadcasting Dept.'s letter No. 19/1/42-A.& G. of 2nd May 1942.

The Public communiques to be issued under General Headquarters' letter of 4th April, 1942, are:-

(i) Preliminary Communique) by the competent Military
(ii) Military Communique) Authority.
(iii) Press Note - by the Civil authorities.

4. When the Immediate report covering both Civil & Military items (vide para 7(i) of Civil Defence Dept. Circular No.74/42 of 19th Febry.1942) is submitted to General Headquarters a copy of it will be sent by the submitting officer to the Provincial Govt. concerned if he is in the Headquarters station of the Provincial Govt. If he is not, he will repeat it to intermediate Military Commands and the appropriate Command which maintains touch with the Provincial Govt. will at once send them a copy. Instructions to this effect have been issued to all Military Commands and it will be for the Provincial Govt. concerned to make the necessary representation to the appropriate Command if they do not receive a copy of the immediate report.

5. The Govt. of India consider that reports by Military authorities on Civil items should only be made after consultation with the appropriate Civil authorities whenever this is possible and will not lead to undue delay. Instructions to this effect will be issued to all Military Commands.

6. Item 37(a) of the Questionnaire "Did any epidemics break out" was marked as a Military Immediate item so that General Headquarters can take the necessary precautions if they decide to move troops into the area. The existence of any existing epidemics should, therefore, be reported under this item.

7. The intention mf in para 3(ii) of Civil Defence Dept. Circular No.74/42 is that local Posts, Telegraphs, Railway, Ports and Civil Aviation Officials should submit breakdown reports direct to

the appropriate Dept. of the Govt. of India and not that this should devolve on the Provincial Govt.

- - - - - - -

Copy of letter from the Govt. of India, Civil Defence Dept. to all Provincial Govts. No.390/41(A.R.P.)(C.D.) dated the 22nd May 1942.

- - - - -

C.D.D. Circular No.227/42
Reports of Air Raids.

- - -

I am directed to refer to paragraph 8 of Civil Defence Dept. Circular No.74/42 dated the 19th Febry. 1942 and to request that the date the report was despatched from the office of origin be always noted thereon.

GOVERNMENT OF HIS HIGHNESS THE MAHARAJA OF MYSORE.

SECRET.

No. 2-11/W.Encls. General and Revenue Secretariat,

*Dated Bangalore,...*1st.....July.....*1942*.

FROM

Chief
The Secretary to the Government of
His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore.

To

The District Magistrates of Districts.

SIR,

Collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects.

- - - -

In continuation of this office letter No.2194-2202/W dated the 27th March 1942 on the above subject, I am directed to forward for your information and guidance, copies of Government of India, Civil Defence Department Circular letters Nos.190/42, 208/42 and 390/41-A.R.P.(C.D.) dated the 27th April, 9th May and 18th May, 1942, respectively, together with copies of answers to questionnaire, regarding air raids on Visagapatam.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,

For Chief Secretary to Government.

SECRET.

Copy of letter No.84/42-A.R.P.(C.D.), dated the 9th May 1942 from the Government of India, Civil Defence Department, to all Chief Secretaries and Chief Commissioners.

- - - -

Civil Defence Department Circular No.208/42.

Subject:- Raids on Visagapatam Port.

- - - -

I am directed to send herewith a note on the Japanese Raids on Visagapatam Port on April 6th, 1942.

- - - -

The two Japanese Air Raids on Visagapatam Port at 1137 hours and 1659 hours on 6th April were miserably weak attacks, but the results of them stressed very clearly the lessons that were indicated in Rangoon.

1. The A.R.P. forces that were in two large depots, under full time pay, constant discipline and training and with rations available were the only body of men who all stayed and carried on as a body.

2. Although not a bomb was dropped on the city and only some 25 on the docks a mile away, (the main raid was out at sea) the population of the city fell from 75000 to about 25000 in the days before the raid on the scare that Japanese forces were about, and from 25,000 to little over 2000 on the evening of the raids.

On the evening of the 6th about 15000 remained and on the 7th about two to three thousand. Number had risen on the 13th to five to seven thousand.

There was no question of bringing in troops along the roads used by this exodus, but the difficulties can be imagined had such a necessity arisen.

3. The casualties on land were seven killed and about a dozen injured. Unfortunately there was one direct hit on a shelter near the docks which accounted for all the seven deaths.

4. There was, as in Rangoon, no screaming panic during the raid, but the same numbness. Both before and after them people put down their heads and went.

5. The essential labour both of the municipality and the power house, went, and most of the directing staff. Bombs straddled the power house, but did not damage it. The walls of the Harbour workshop were slightly cracked and a small store was demolished.

But Mr. Lazarus, Divisional Electrical Engineer, the head of the Power House, worked heroically for 18 hours with one faithful assistant, doing the work stoking himself.

And the Congress Chairman of the Municipality stayed and was constantly about, and very angry with his subordinates when some of them trickled back.

6. After the raid no food was on sale in the city for 4 days, as all the banias and eating house keepers had locked their doors and gone. A very few opened on the 10th April.

The District Magistrate broke open shops, commandeered stocks, and established eating depots, getting in cooks from the country-side through his tahsildars.

7. The Special Emergency Police lost 49 of their men by flight, a few of the Regular Police also went but exact details are not known.

The Civic Guards went.

8. Some of the male nursing staff from hospitals left, but sufficient staff to carry on remained. Only 3 out of 48 sweepers stayed.

9. Some of the P. & T. Staff went, but sufficient remained to carry on with difficulty. A set of telephone lines connecting the Fort with the Town were damaged by one bomb and the need of a good messenger service was emphasised.

10. While senior officers very rightly went out to help, there was difficulty because their telephones were not manned and they could not find each other.

Reliable deputies should be left at telephones and should be kept informed of the whereabouts of officers.

In Burma morning and evening meetings were found of value.

For those connected with the town itself the Control Room should be made every use of as a clearing house and meeting place.

11. The presence in a raided town of direct representatives of the Government of the Province with powers at least to make immediate and authoritative recommendations and in smaller cases, grants of rewards for gallantry is of great importance.

It is equally important that from now onwards all officers should constantly move about among their subordinates, cheer them up, and raise morale.

The conclusions to be drawn are -

A. Discipline, leadership and esprit de corps in large depots situated away from likely target areas, are the best and probably only way of keeping A.R.P. Services together. Food and fuel at their posts is the next greatest need.

B. The District Magistrate becomes temporary dictator and must be prepared to do so.

C. Arrangements to shepherd the crown of refugees, which cannot be stopped, are essential.

D. A good messenger service is essential.

E. Repair services for essentials such as P. & T. lines, Water Mains and so forth are essential with necessary stores.

Copy of letter No.84/42-A.R.P.(C.D.)., dated the 27th April 1942 from the Government of India, Civil Defence Department, to all Provincial Govts. and Chief Commissioners.

- - - - - -

Civil Defence Department Circular No.190/42.

Subject:- Report on air raids on Vizagapatam.

- - - - - -

With reference to this Department's letter No.390/41-A.R.P.(C.D.) dated the 19th February, 1942, on the subject of reporting information regarding hostile attacks and their effects, I am directed to forward herewith the report on the air raids on Vizagapatam received from the Govt. of Madras.

2. The value of the report is apparent and it is clear that the questionnaire forwarded with the above letter has proved, as it was intended to be a help and not an obsession to the reporting officer.

The answers to the questionnaire will represent the frame-work of the final historical report on air raids on India and it is hoped that the questionnaire will help the reporting authorities at various stages to send all information they have, which will be of value and to exclude irrelevant information.

Answers to questionnaire

1. AIR RAID WARNINGS:

(a) - The first Yellow Warning was received at 08.40 hours.

(b) - The Red Warning was received at 09.40 hours. Air Raid Message green received at 12.25 hours. The second Red Warning was received at 13.37 hours. Air Raid Message Green at 16.20 hours. The third Red Warning was received at 20.13 hours.

(c) - Air Raid Alarm was sounded in each case from between 30 to 40 seconds or less after receipt of the message.

(d) - Generally speaking the air raid message Red was received from the Army authorities only when planes were actually overhead and the air raid alarm generally synchronised with the fall of bombs and anti-air craft fire.

(e) The wind was generally speaking favourable to audibility and the sirens were heard in almost all quarters in the town.

(f) - A majority of the populace took cover though a certain number remained on the roofs as spectators during the first raid. During the subsequent raids the population took cover with more thoroughness.

(g) - Most of the traffic got off the streets immediately. Since the alarm was in force for fairly considerable periods few vehicles reappeared on the streets at the later stages when no raiders were actually in sight.

(h) - There was no obstruction to A.R.P. vehicles.

(i) - The all Clear was sounded 2 hours 45 minutes, 2 hours 43 minutes and 2 hours 18 minutes respectively after the various Air Raid Alarms.

(j) - No bogus messages appear to have been received by the A.R.P.

) - Air Raid Messages Green were sent by the Army authorities long after the raid and only very shortly before the re-appearance of enemy aircraft. After the first all Clear there was a general relaxation and assumption that all danger has passed which led to a tendency to relaxation relax all precautions forgetting that the Yellow still persisted.

) - It is suggested that some improved methods of spotting and reporting the appreach of enemy aircraft should be instituted forthwith by the Army authorities in the immediate neighbourhood north of Vizagapatam. The receipt of Air Raid Message Red from the Army authorities was in both the afternoon raids belated. In the 13.37 hours raid the air raid message Red was received from the Military until the first wave of bombers was actually over the Fort area dropping bombs. Had the Army observation and reporting system been more efficient it should have been possible to sound the sirens one or two minutes before the actual arrival of bombers.

OBSCURATION:

The obscuration appeared to be strictly observed during the night by the whole populace. Electric power was cut off in the middle of the night owing to the disappearance of the Power House personnel.

A.R.P. CONTROL ROOM:

) - Control room functioned efficiently.

) - "

) - Telephonic communication was fairly satisfactory although the behaviour of some of the Operators in the Telephone Exchange was unsatisfactory since certain personnel absented themselves and the work had to be carried on by a few Operators who stood fast. Telephonic communication with the Fort was interrupted. One bomb blew down a number of telephone wires and in order to communicate with the Fort a Motor cycle Messenger had to be used. The absolute necessity for several motor cycle messengers being attached to the Control Rooms of the respective A.R.P. schemes in Vizagapatam was clearly demonstrated. Another motor cycle messenger was also utilised to convey urgent papers to the Telegraph Office.

) - Yes.

) - The A.R.P. Control Room staff were on duty throughout the day and had to sleep at night in the rooms adjacent to the Control Centre. It was demonstrated that two full paid shifts for the Control Room are necessary since the strain imposed on one shift for long periods was great. Some reliefs were arranged by utilising office and instructional staff who form the volunteer shift but these were actually required for other duties also, such as supervision of emergency feeding, compilation of reports etc.

(f) - Only one "incident" was reported. This consisted of the appearance of a casualty in Allipur. This casualty appears to have come from the Harbour. He was suffering from shock.

(g) - In spite of the lack of air raid damage in the town itself a very large number of telephone calls were made to the Control Room by posts, enquirers after information, heads of Govt. Depts., Telegraph and Telephone Staff etc. The direct line system to various points with broadcasting switch apparatus under the direct control of the A.R.P. Controller was found to be a great help and of

a utmost utility in distributing instructions and warnings rapidly. The observation Post built on the spur of King George Hospital and connected by the direct line telephone to the Control Centre was extremely useful in reporting the movements of planes and sometimes of bombing in the Fort Area.

(h) - When a fuse of the lighting system failed the necessity for fans and artificial ventilation was clearly shown as well as the advisability of having a small emergency electric lighting plant. The heat of a number of oil lamps in the Control Room was extremely oppressive. Further, minor structural modifications which have to be made to the Control Room to increase the strength of arches will result in a further reduction of such ventilation as exists already. The provision of a small emergency engine and dynamo both for providing emergency lighting and charging batteries is most necessary.

4. REPORT CENTRES: - Nil

5. AIR RAID WARDENS:

(a) - The air raid wardens did not have to function as a reporting agency. The majority of the Volunteer Wardens failed to put in an appearance. A few volunteer Post Wardens turned up at their posts. The majority of the paid (staff) wardens appeared to have remained at their posts. The exact position as regards the number of absentees is under investigation by the Chief Warden who is compiling figures. His report is not yet ready.

6. CASUALTY SERVICES:

I. Fixed First Aid Posts.

(a) - Yes.
(b) - -
(c) - No.
(d) - No.
(e) - One.
(f) - One.
(g) - Staff on duty according to the roster.
(h) - Yes, on the occasion.
(i) - Nil.
(j) - Nurses should be appointed immediately.

II. Mobile First Aid Posts. - Not yet ready.

III. Mobile First Aid Parties:

(a) - Paid personnel on duty. 50% of volunteers only turned up.
(b) - Only 50% of volunteers turned up.
(c) - No.
(d) - No.
(e) - One.
(f) - One.
(g) - Paid personnel did duty in shifts throughout the day.
(h) - -
(i) - -
(j) - Certain medical equipment lacking.
(k) - Nil.

IV. Ambulance Service:

(a) - Yes.
(b) - -
(c) - No.
(d) - No.
(e) - Port requisitioned an ambulance which was sent.
(f) - Till casualties were sent to hospital.
(g) - Seven.
(h) - Yes.
(i) - Nil.
(j) - Nil.

7. RESCUE PARTIES: - Rescue parties nothing in the town.

8. STREET FIRE PARTIES:- There were none of these and they had no opportunity to function. During the night a majority of the inhabitants appear to have left the place. Shops have been closed and the owners have departed. Vizagapatam is more or less deserted and street fire party system would in any case have failed totally. In my opinion the organisation of unelaborate scheme of Street Fire Parties is almost completely a waste of time. It would be preferable if the number of water storage tanks and the strength of the Fire Brigade were increased in order to confine any major conflagration which might occur.

9. GAS IDENTIFICATION SERVICE: - Nil.

10. GAS DECONTAMINATION SERVICE: - Nil.

11. A.R.P. DEPOTS:

(a) - On the whole the A.R.P. Depot functioned satisfactorily. Very few First Aid Volunteer personnel appeared at the Depots and none of the Volunteer rescue party personnel appeared at all. The raids completely demonstrated the unreliability of volunteer personnel and the fact that no dependance can be placed on them.

(b) - Vide (a) above.

(c) - The necessity for cooking arrangements in Depots was already clearly demonstrated owing to the flight of shop keepers and those running catering establishments in the town. Emergency feeding requires to be provided not merely for Depot Services but for paid Wardens etc. who are unable to buy food or obtain cooked meals.

12. FIRE BRIGADES AND TRAILER PUMP SQUADS.

(a) - The Fire Brigades were not called out.

(b) - Certain off-duty firemen failed to report for duty in the Fire Station. One Driver was also absent.

(c) to (i) - Nil.

(j) - Only two pumps are available in Vizagapatam. There are three tenders. This is totally inadequate.

(k) - The high level town service reservoir was not kept filled by the Municipality. This tank contains 75,000 gallons

in order to produce some pressure in the mains.

(l) to (p) - Nil.

(q) - The necessity for having firemen residence adjacent to the Fire Station was demonstrated. The feeding of firemen and drivers was also necessary. They were fed at the nearest A.F.H. Depot, and their own messing is being arranged. A temporary mess room has been provided. Some Firemen who were away off duty could not be found and failed to turn up as already mentioned above.

13. MOBILE REPAIR UNITS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES AND FOR MAINTENANCE OF VITAL SERVICES SUCH AS COMMUNICATIONS, WHERE SUPPLY, DRAINAGE DRAINAGE, ETC:-

Not used because all damage was in Fort area.

14. HOSPITALS:

(a) - Yes.
(b) - Nil.
(c) - No.
(d) - No.
(e) - 52 Beds: 108 Beds on floor - Total 160.
(f) - 19, None discharged - 2 absconded
(g) - No deaths.
(h) - None No.
(i) - Immediate attention was given. Yes.
(j) - Immediate attention was given.
(k) - Light cut off in the new out-patient block owing to failure of power house.
(l) - Nil.

15. CORPSE DISPOSAL ORGANISATION.- Does not exist.

16. SALVAGE ORGANISATION, INCLUDING DEMOLITION AND CLEARANCE OF DEBRIS. - No occasion to use this.

17. FEEDING SERVICES:

(a) Stocks of food had already been purchased and about 200 persons were fed in the evening on receipt of the final air raid Message 'Green" This included the Fire Brigade and the A.R.P. Services. Food was un-obtainable in the town for many. It is understood that some considerable inconvenience was experienced by the Police who had not yet perfected emergency feeding arrangements - Telephone and Telegraph personnel have to be fed.

(b) It was seen that food could be cooked centrally but required to be distributed in a motor vehicle or vehicles to outlying portions of the town where A.R.P. Personnel were stationed e.g.; First Aid Posts and Warden Posts.

(c) The necessity for canteen vans was demonstrated and these should be provided. Provision of hot tea to Control, Depot and other staff after long periods of waiting under tension while raids were in progress had a very beneficial effect.

18. REINFORCEMENTS.

(a) - It was ascertained from the Port A.L.P. Controller by means of a motor cycle Messenger that he required one Ambulance. This was despatched to the Port and removed casualties to Hospital.

(b) - No difficulty was experienced in the arrangement.

(c) & (d) - Nil.

19. CARE OF HOMELESS:- No homeless. No damage in town.

20. EVACUATION:-

(a) - No evacuation till last night when about 10,000 people left.

(b) - Mostly on foot along Pendurti road.

(c) - None by railway as trains did not run.

(d) - There was no panic. People are not yet returning.

(e) - Two food depots have been opened with stores already bought by Govt. and stored in a central depot. Steps are being taken to open some more depots to sell food stuffs commandeered under the Defence of India Rules.

(f) - All the merchants ran away and left their shops locked.

21. NATURE OF ATTACK:

(i) - Air craft approached from the North-east in most cases and in one case from East North East.

(ii) - Bombers generally came in waves of five and sometimes three. There was no Fighter escort.

(iii) - Bombers generally approached in two waves.

(iv) - The first raids appear to have been made at a low height of about 2 to 4 thousand feet. The last raid in the evening appears to have been made at a height of between 8 and 10 thousand feet.

(v) - Estimates of the number of bombs actually dropped vary considerably since a number appear to have been dropped, in water. Some 20 to 225 bombs would appear to have been dropped.

(vi) - Incidents were confined to the Port Area.

(vii) - Only H.E. bombs appear to have been dropped. They appear to have been of about 250 lbs. So far as is known no delayed action bombs were dropped.

(viii) - There are no reports of any machine-gunning.

(ix) - No known.

(x) - One of our Aircraft was in the air in the morning. It is not known whether this sustained any damage.

(xi) - To(xix) - Nil. So far as it is known.

22. PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES AGAINST WHICH ATTACK APPARENTLY DIRECTED:

- Power house and ships in Harbour.

23. EXTENT TO WHICH APPARENT OBJECT OF ATTACK WAS ACHIEVED:

- Not achieved, though very near misses.

24. CASUALTIES:

(a) - 5 killed. All in underground shelter.
(b) - 19 injured. Mostly in underground shelter.
(c) - Nil.

(c) - Unknown.
(d) - 24.

25. SCALE:

(a) (i) - Behaviour of the general public during the first air raid was fairly satisfactory. There was no panic and people took cover. At intervals between the first All Clear and the succeeding Air Raid warning a certain number of people walked out of the town. During the night a very large number of people left Visagapatam. At least 10,000 would appear to have left and in the morning the city presents a completely deserted appearance. The owners of shops closed and padlocked their shops and left. One or two tea shops are open but only a skeleton of the original population remains.

(ii) - Police:- A tour of the Harbour area disclosed that there was no Special Emergency Force sentries visible at any point in the Port. A few of the staff of the Harbour Police Station were to be seen. The Port was deserted and there was nobody to be seen in any of the offices. It is believed that the behaviour of the Reserve Police Force is satisfactory.

(iii) - A.R.P. Services:- On the whole the paid personnel behaved well. There men are a few instances of off-duty personnel putting in a slightly delayed appearance. All however except one driver were present during the raid. In the evening after the final All Clear one Rescue Party Deputy Leader and the P.W.D. Supervisor/Specialist Instructor in charge of Rescue Parties disappeared, as well as the Chief Instructor. They have failed to report on the 7th so far. Two recently posted clerks who have only been in the A.R.P. Office for a short time here absented themselves. They are both Revenue Dept. personnel. A Clerk and a Storeman of No.1 Depot have disappeared. From such information as is available at present 8 or 10 Staff Wardens appear to have disappeared and about half a dozen messengers (paid) would also appear to have vanished. At least 50% of the Honorary Wardens have disappeared and at least 50% or more of the Honorary Post Wardens are missing.

(iv) - Fire Brigade:- As already reported one Driver and four off-duty Constables failed to put in an appearance. The morale of the remaining firemen is fairly satisfactory.

(v) - Hospital Staff:-The menial staff appears to have disappeared and a certain number of Ward Boys etc. have absconded.

(vi) - Public Utility concerns:- The staff of the Govt. Power House absconded for a time, no power whatever has been available. Volunteers had to be obtained to stoke the Power House boilers. A single Switch Board Operator remained in the Electric Corporation building. All Repair Gangs etc. disappeared.

(vii) - Govt. servants:- It is understood that a very large number of clerks in the Govt. Offices here disappeared.

(a) The Municipal Commr. could not be found. In the Municipal Office while raids were in progress throughout the 5th. No response could be obtained from the Municipal Office telephone or from the

bungalow of the Municipal Health Officer.

~~(b) xxxxxxx~~

(b) The staff of the Sewage Farm was absent throughout the day. The only person present in the Sewage Farm was the Staff Warden since this is also an A.R.P. Post.

(c) All Municipal labour disappeared. The Sewage Farm was deserted and no water Repair Gang is available. The Water Works staff are not to be found except for a chowkidar in the Waltair Uplands Reservoir and an Electrician in the Pumping Station. Whether these were also present during the actual raids is doubtful.

(ix) - Railways:

(i) It is understood that Ticket Collectors and other such staff in the Railway stations have disappeared.

(ii) Almost all engine drivers appear to have disappeared. A certain number of the European employees were driving trains.

(x) - Ports:

(i) Port staff except for European personnel appear to have absconded completely, with the exception of one or two Port A.R.P. Staff.

(ii) Dock labour is not to be seen.

(iii) Crew of the vessels left the vessels in some cases while raids were in progress. In the case of one ship containing explosives, this was understandable.

xi) - Educational institutions: No information available.

ii) - Domestic servants:- A large number of domestic servants appear to have disappeared and almost all paid motor car drivers have absconded.

ii) - Factory Labour:- The Port Workshops was deserted.

(xiv) - The majority of unorganised labour has almost completely disappeared.

(xv) - Taxis:- Busses are not to be seen in Visagapatam. It is said that Military pickets are stopping them on the outskirts of the town.

(xvi) - Almost all the shop keepers have locked their shops and left.

(xvii) - Very large number of the clerical staffs in business houses have disappeared. The Agent of the Imperial

~~(xviii)~~ - Bank was carrying out the entire work of his bank assisted only be one Cashier.

(xviii) - During actual raids there was no panic but in general at nights after the All Clear had been sounded the population showed a determination to leave Visagapatam. In the case of labour Organised Labour camps on the outskirts of Visagapatam to villages. A certain amount of the movement may be due to an anxiety to remove women and children to places of safety and when this movement is completed there is a possibility of a certain number returning to the city. This is unlikely to take place for several days.

(b) - No steps were taken by the A.R.P. to inform the public of the facts since there was scarcely any public to inform.

(c) - Public in general obeyed the orders and instructions issued by the authorities.

(d) - It is doubtful whether further propaganda would achieve much useful purpose.

(e) - There is no local Press.

(f) - Nil.

26. - Nil.

27. CRIME DURING AND AFTER RAID ESPECIALLY LOOTING:- No looting during raid but on the 8th morning N.M.S. Bakery was looted. The Police have arrested some culprits.

28. FIFTH COLUMN ACTIVITIES AND ESPECIALLY AND ESPECIALLY THOSE OF THE TERRORIST GROUPS:- Nothing known yet.

29. WORKING OF CIVIC GUARDS, POLICE AND POLICE ARRANGEMENTS:- Police arrangements good.

30. DAMAGE CAUSED:

(i) - Damage to Port Workshops and roads in port area.

(ii) - Nil.

(iii) - Nil.

(iv) - Not known.

31. COMMUNICATIONS.

(i) - No effect.

(ii) - Impeded owing to desertion of staff.

(iii) - Not affected. Worked well.

(iv) - -do-

(v) - -do-

(vi) - Seriously affected. No labour available in Port.

32. WORKING OF TELEPHONE SYSTEM DURING RAID:

(a) - Yes.
(b) - Yes.
(c) - -
(d) - Yes.
(e) - Yes.
(f) - Wires in the Port Area well all damaged.
(g) - -
(h) - -

33. WATER SUPPLY:

(1) Drinking Water.

(a) - No.
(b) - Alternative system of wells not used.
(c) - -

(2) UNFILTERED WATER SUPPLY:

(a) - No.
(b) - Nil.
(c) - Nil.

34. COAL GAS: - No gas.

35. ELECTRICITY:
(a) - -
(b) - No damage but power house did not function for about 2 hrs.
(c) - -

36. CONSERVANCY AND SANITATION.
(a) - No.
(b) - -
(c) - -

37. EPIDEMICS.
(a) - No.

38. SHELTERS AND SLIT TRENCHES:
(a) - The public in general took shelter in their own houses or in whatever houses were available. Little use appears to have been made of slit trenches. The Verandah A.R.P. shelters were used.
(b) - No Air Raid damage was experienced in Vizagapatam town itself. Hence the protection afforded was not tested.
(c) - Nil.
(d) - Nil.
(e) - Additional verandah shelters in the congested portions of the town would be advisable.

39. ANIMALS.- Nil.

40. MAINTENANCE OF FOOD SUPPLIES:
Food is being supplied from two depots. All suppliers have lef

41. EFFECTS OF RAID ON PRICES AND MARKETS:- Report will follow.

42. WORKING OF CIVIL DEFENCE INFORMATION BUREAUX.

43. WERE THE GENERAL PREPARATIONS MADE INADEQUATE IN ANY RESPECT.
- Not inadequate.

44. LIAISON AND CO-OPERATION BETWEEN CIVIL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES:
- Good.

45. EMERGENCY ADMINISTRATION:
(a) - Details will follow.
(b) - -do-

46. PUBLIC OPINION: - Details will follow.

Copy of letter from the Govt. of India, Civil Defence Dept. to all Provincial Govts. etc., No.390/41-ARP(C.D.) dated the 18th May 1942.

- - -

CIVIL DEFENCE DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO.220/42.

Reporting information regarding hostile attacks and their effects.

- - -

The following points are brought to the Provincial Govts' notice with regard to Civil Defence Dept. Circular No.74/42 of 19th February 1942, on the subject of reporting information regarding hostile attacks and their effects:-

1. The questionnaire attached to that letter was meant to be the servant and not the master of those required to furnish reports; it was intended to help them and not to be an obsession to them.

2. It is not expected that replies to anything like all the items will be available when the earlier reports are sent.

The submission of the Immediate Report and the Preliminary Report should on no account be delayed on account of the absence of information on any of the points. Such information as is available must be sent.

3. These reports are Confidential reports for official use only and have no connection with the communiques to be issued to the public which are dealt with in General Headquarters Most Secret letter No.2201/G.S.1.(c) of 4th April 1942, which was forwarded to all Provincial Govts. with Information and Broadcasting Dept.'s letter No. 19/1/42-A.& G. of 2nd May 1942.

The Public communiques to be issued under General Headquarters' letter of 4th April, 1942, are:-

(i) Preliminary Communique } by the competent Military
(ii) Military Communique } Authority.

(iii) Press Note - by the Civil authorities.

4. When the Immediate report covering both Civil & Military items (vide para 7(1) of Civil Defence Dept. Circular No.74/42 of 19th Febry.1942) is submitted to General Headquarters a copy of it will be sent by the submitting officer to the Provincial Govt. concerned if he is in the Headquarters station of the Provincial Govt. If he is not, he will repeat it to intermediate Military Commands and the appropriate Command which maintains touch with the Provincial Govt. will at once send them a copy. Instructions to this effect have been issued to all Military Commands and it will be for the Provincial Govt. concerned to make the necessary representation to the appropriate Command if they do not receive a copy of the immediate report.

5. The Govt. of India consider that reports by Military authorities on Civil items should only be made after consultation with the appropriate Civil authorities whenever this is possible and will not lead to undue delay. Instructions to this effect will be issued to all Military Commands.

6. Item 37(a) of the Questionnaire "Did any epidemics break out" was marked as a Military Immediate item so that General Headquarters can take the necessary precautions if they decide to move troops into the area. The existence of any existing epidemics should, therefore, be reported under this item.

7. The intention ~~of~~ in para 3(ii) of Civil Defence Dept. Circular No.74/42 is that local Posts, Telegraphs, Railway, Ports and Civil Aviation Officials should submit breakdown reports direct to

the appropriate Dept. of the Govt. of India and not that this should devolve on the Provincial Govt.

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Copy of letter from the Govt. of India, Civil Defence Dept. to all Provincial Govts. No.390/41(A.R.P.)(C.D.) dated the 22nd May 1942.

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C.D.D. Circular No.227/42
Reports of Air Raids.

- - -

I am directed to refer to paragraph 8 of Civil Defence Dept. Circular No.74/42 dated the 19th Febry. 1942 and to request that the date the report was despatched from the office of origin be always noted thereon.

ANNEXURE 1.

QUESTIONNAIRE.

1. Air Raid Warnings.—

(*a*) Time when Yellow warning was received.
(*b*) Time when Red warning was received.
(*c*) Time when Air Raid Alarm was sounded.
(*d*) How much time elapsed between the sounding of the Air Raid Alarm and the actual arrival of the raiders?
(*e*) Was the Air Raid Alarm audible?
(*f*) Did the populace take cover?
(*g*) Did traffic get off the streets promptly?
(*h*) Was there any obstruction of Air Raid Precautions vehicles?
(*i*) How long after the warning was the "All Clear" sounded?
M.I. (*j*) *Were any bogus wireless or other messages received?*
(*k*) Any other points.
(*l*) Suggestions.

2. Obscuration.—

(*a*) Was total obscuration secured?
(*b*) How long after the Warning did it take to secure it?
(*c*) Was obscuration good or bad in the localities where bombs fell?
(*d*) Any other points.
(*e*) Suggestions.

3. A. R. P. Control Rooms.—

(*a*) Did they function satisfactorily?
(*b*) If not, in what respects did they fail?
(*c*) Was telephonic communication satisfactory?
(*d*) Was the Messenger Service used and was it satisfactory?
(*e*) How long was the staff on duty and were reliefs necessary?
(*f*) Number of incidents reported.
(*g*) Any other points.
(*h*) Suggestions.

4. Report Centres.—

(*a*) Did they function satisfactorily?
(*b*) If not, in what respects did they fail?
(*c*) Was the telephonic communication satisfactory?
(*d*) Was the Messenger Service used and was it satisfactory?
(*e*) How long was the staff on duty and were reliefs necessary?
(*f*) Number of incidents reported.
(*g*) Any other points.
(*h*) Suggestions.

5. Air Raid Wardens.—

(*a*) Did they function satisfactorily ?
(*b*) If not, in what respects did they fail ?
(*c*) Were there any casualties ?
(*d*) How long were the Wardens on duty and did the relief system work ?
(*e*) Was the number sufficient ?
(*f*) Any other points.
(*g*) Suggestions.

6. Casualty Services.—

(i) Fixed First Aid Posts.—

(*a*) Did they function satisfactorily ?
(*b*) If not, in what respects did they fail ?
(*c*) Were there any casualties among the personnel ?
(*d*) Were any First Aid Posts damaged by bombs ?
(*e*) How many cases did they deal with ?
(*f*) Of the number given in (*e*) how many did they send on to hospital ?
(*g*) How long were the staffs on duty and were reliefs necessary ?
(*h*) Was the number sufficient ?
(*i*) Any other points.
(*j*) Suggestions.

(ii) Mobile First Aid Posts.—

(*a*) Did they function satisfactorily ?
(*b*) If not, in what respects did they fail ?
(*c*) Were there any casualties among the personnel ?
(*d*) Were any First Aid Posts damaged by bombs ?
(*e*) How many cases did they deal with ?
(*f*) Of the number given in (*e*) how many did they send on to hospital ?
(*g*) How long were the staffs on duty and were reliefs necessary.
(*h*) Was the number sufficient ?
(*i*) Any other points.
(*j*) Suggestions.

(iii) Mobile First Aid Parties.—

(*a*) Did they function satisfactorily ?
(*b*) If not, in what respects did they fail ?
(*c*) Were there any casualties among the personnel ?
(*d*) Was any damage done to equipment through bombs or accident ?
(*e*) How many cases did they deal with ?
(*f*) Of the number given in (*e*) how many did they send on to hospital ?
(*g*) How long were these units on duty ?
(*h*) How many units were there and how many were used ?
(*i*) Was the number sufficient ?
(*j*) Any other points.
(*k*) Suggestions.

(iv) Ambulance Service.—

(*a*) Did it function satisfactorily ?
(*b*) If not, in what respects did it fail ?

(*c*) Were there any casualties among the personnel ?

(*d*) Was there any damage done to equipment through bombs or accident ?

(*e*) How many cases did it deal with ?

(*f*) How long was it at work ?

(*g*) How many ambulances were there and how many were used ?

(*h*) Was the number sufficient ?

(*i*) Any other points.

(*j*) Suggestions.

7. Rescue Parties.—

(*a*) Did they function satisfactorily ?

(*b*) If not, in what respects did they fail ?

(*c*) Were there any casualties among the personnel ?

(*d*) Was any damage done to equipment through bombs or accident ?

(*e*) How many incidents did they deal with ?

(*f*) How long were they at work ?

(*g*) How many parties were there and how many were used ?

(*h*) Was the number sufficient ?

(*i*) How many persons did they rescue alive ?

(*j*) Any other points.

(*k*) Suggestions.

8. Street Fire Parties.—

(*a*) Did they function satisfactorily ?

(*b*) If not, in what respects did they fail ?

(*c*) Were there any casualties among the personnel ?

(*d*) How many fires did they deal with ?

(*e*) How many fires did they control without calling on the Fire Brigade or Trailer Pump Squads ?

(*f*) How long were they at work ?

(*g*) Was the number sufficient ?

(*h*) Did the public help adequately ?

(*i*) How many fires did the public extinguish without calling on any of the fire fighting services ?

(*j*) Did Fire watchers function satisfactorily ?

(*k*) Any other points.

(*l*) Suggestions.

9. Gas Identification Service.—

(*a*) Did it function satisfactorily ?

(*b*) If not, in what respects did it fail ?

(*c*) Were there any casualties among the personnel—

(i) from gas ?

(ii) from other causes ?

(*d*) How long was the personnel at work ?

(*e*) Was the establishment sufficient ?

(*f*) Any other points.

(*g*) Suggestions.

10. Gas Decontamination Service.—

(*a*) Did it function satisfactorily ?
(*b*) If not, in what respects did it fail ?
(*c*) Were there any casualties among the personnel:—
(i) from gas ?
(ii) from other causes ?
(*d*) How long was the personnel at work ?
(*e*) Was the establishment sufficient ?
(*f*) Any other points.
(*g*) Suggestions.

11. A. R. P. Depots.—

(*a*) Did they function satisfactorily ?
(*b*) If not, in what respects did they fail ?
(*c*) Any other points.
(*d*) Suggestions.

12. Fire Brigades and Trailer Pump Squads.—

(*a*) Did they function satisfactorily ?
(*b*) If not, in what respects did they fail ?
(*c*) Were there any casualties among the personnel ?
(*d*) Was any equipment damaged or destroyed by bombs or accidents ?
(*e*) How many fires were caused other than those in para 8 (*e*) and (*i*) ?
(*f*) How many of these were put out ?
(*g*) How many hours after the raid was it before all fires were under control ?
(*h*) How long were the Fire Brigade Parties at work ?
(*i*) Were any reliefs possible ?
(*j*) Were the numbers of firemen and amount of pumps and equipment adequate ?
(*k*) Was the water supply adequate ?
(*l*) Were many demolitions necessary to prevent fire spreading ?
(*m*) What buildings were set on fire ?
(*n*) What was approximate figure in rupees of damage caused by fire ?
(*o*) Was there any delay in fire fighting services setting to the scene of fires ?
(*p*) Were the arrangements for summoning them satisfactory ?
(*q*) Any other points.
(*r*) Suggestions.

13. Mobile Repair Units of Public Utilities and for Maintenance of Vital Services such as Communications, Water Supply, Drainage, etc.—

(*a*) Did they function satisfactorily ?
(*b*) If not, in what respects did they fail ?
(*c*) Were there any casualties among the personnel ?
(*d*) Was any equipment destroyed or damaged by bombs or accident ?
(*e*) How many parties of various kinds had to function ?
(*f*) How long did they have to work ?
(*g*) Were reliefs necessary ?
(*h*) Was the number of parties and their equipment adequate ?
(*i*) Any other points.
(*j*) Suggestions.

Hospitals.—

(*a*) Did they function satisfactorily ?
(*b*) If not, in what respects did they fail ?
(*c*) Were there any casualties among the personnel ?
(*d*) Were any Hospitals damaged by bombs ?
(*e*) How many beds were ready to receive casualties at the time the raid started ?
(*f*) How many wounded persons admitted to hospital were discharged after.—

1 week.
2 weeks.
3 weeks.
4 weeks.
5 weeks.
6 weeks.
Over 6 weeks.

(*g*) How many died after admission ?
(*h*) Was there any difficulty in disposing of dead bodies ?
(*i*) Was the number of beds and the amount of equipment adequate ?
(*j*) How long was it before all operations were completed ?
(*k*) Any other points.
(*l*) Suggestions.

15. Corpse Disposal Organization.—

(*a*) Did it function satisfactorily ?
(*b*) If not, in what respects did it fail ?
(*c*) How many corpses did it dispose of ?
(*d*) How many of these were unidentified ?
(*e*) Did friends or relations come to identify corpses ?
(*f*) Was mass burial or mass cremation resorted to ?
(*g*) If so, how many corpses were disposed of by :—

(i) mass burial ?
(ii) mass cremation ?

(*h*) How long was it after the "All Clear" before all corpses were removed from the streets ?
(*i*) Who did the actual handling and removal of corpses ?
(*j*) Any other points.
(*k*) Suggestions.

16. Salvage Organization including Demolition and Clearance of Debris.—

(*a*) Did this function satisfactorily :—

(i) As regards mobile parties for immediate salvage ?
(ii) As regards leisurely salvage, demolition and clearance of debris and disposal of salvaged articles ?

(*b*) Approximately what quantities of what classes of salvaged material such as metals, bricks, timber were sold to the Supply Department ?

17. Feeding the Services.—

(*a*) What steps were taken to provide food for Police, Fire Brigade and Air Raid Precautions Services ?
(*b*) Were they adequate ?
(*c*) Suggestions.

18. Reinforcements.—

(*a*) Were these necessary in any area in respect of any of the Mobile A. R. P. or Fire Fighting Services ?

(*b*) If so, were they arranged satisfactorily ?

(*c*) Any other points.

(*d*) Suggestions.

19. Care of Homeless.—

M.I. (*a*) *About how many people needed food and shelter on account of being bombed out of their homes or of being removed on account of unexploded bombs**

(*b*) Did the arrangements work satisfactorily ?

(*c*) If not, in what respects did they fail ?

* *N.B.*—After the Immediate Report has been submitted this will be treated as a Civil Item.

20. Evacuation.—

M.I. (*a*) *About what numbers joined in the Evacuation ?*

M.I. (*b*) *Was it mostly on foot and along what roads ?*

M.I. (*c*) *How much was by railway and along what lines ?*

M.I. (*d*) *Extent to which panic evacuation was checked and people began to return.*

(*e*) Did any pre-arranged schemes work according to plan ?

(*f*) If not, in what respects did they fail ?

(*g*) Any other points.

(*h*) Suggestions.

21. Nature of Attacks.—

M.I. (i) *From which direction did the attack come ?*

M.I. (ii) *Number of bombers and fighters in each wave.*

M.I. (iii) *Number of waves.*

M.I. (iv) *Heights of raiders.*

M.I. (v) *Number of bombs dropped.*

M.I. (vi) *Number of resulting incidents.*

M.I. (vii) *Kind of bombs—H.E., A.P., Incendiary, Gas, Delayed Action.*

M.I. (viii) *Any machine-gunning ?*

M.I. (ix) *Number of hostile bombers and fighters brought down (a) by A. A. fire. (b) by our fighters. (c) by crashing.*

M.I. (x) *Number of our aircraft brought down.*

M.I. (xi) *Number of hostile airmen—(a) killed. (b) taken prisoner.*

M.I. (xii) *Number of our airmen—(a) killed. (b) saved alive from our aircraft brought down.*

M.I. (xiii) *Number of paratroops landed.*

M.I. (xiv) *Number of enemy troops landed by troop-carrying planes.*

M.I. (xv) *Nature and extent of gas attack.*

M.I. (xvi) *Magnetic and land mines dropped.—*

(*a*) *Number reported.*

(*b*) *Number dealt with.*

(*c*) *Number requiring attention.*

(*d*) *Assistance required.*

M.I. (xvii) *Unexploded bombs.—*

(*a*) *Number reported.*

(*b*) *Number dealt with.*

(*c*) *Number requiring attention.*

(*d*) *Assistance required.*

M.I. (xviii) *Leaflets dropped.*

M.I. (xix) *Any other object dropped.*

M.I. **22. Principle objective against which Attack Apparently Directed.—**

M.I. **23. Extent to which Apparent Objective of Attack was achieved.—**

(Particular reference should be made to serious damage to important buildings; munitions factories; docks; Railways and other communications and to water supply where it may affect troop movements.)

M.I. **24. Casualties.—**

What was the number (gas casualties separately)—

(*a*) *Killed.*

(*b*) *Injured and admitted to hospital.*

(*c*) *Injured and not admitted to hospital.*

(*d*) *Missing.*

(*e*) *Total.*

25. Morale.—

(*a*) What was the general state of the morale of —

(i) The General Public.

(ii) The Police and Civic Guards.

(iii) The A. R. P. Services.

(iv) Hospital Staffs.

(v) Fire Brigades and Trailer Pump Squads.

(vi) Public Utility Concerns.

(vii) Government Servants.

(viii) Local Self-Governing Bodies—

(1) Municipal Commissioners.

(2) Executive Officers.

(3) Labour.

(ix) Railways—

(1) Superior and Clerical Staff.

(2) Labour (including Engine Drivers, Signalmen, etc.)

(x) Ports—

(1) General Port Staffs.

(2) Dock Labour.

(3) Crews of Vessels.

(xi) Educational Institutions.

(xii) Domestic Servants.

(xiii) Factory Labour.

(xiv) General Unorganised Labour.

(xv) Small shop-keeper class.

(xvi) Transport—buses, taxis, lorries, trams.

(xvii) Clerical staffs in business houses.

(xviii) *General appreciation of morale of Civil, Military and Public.*

(*b*) What steps were taken, after the Raid to inform the Public of the facts and to re-assure them ?

(*c*) Did the public obey the orders and instructions issued by the authorities ?

(*d*) If not, is further propaganda needed, in what directions and of what kind?

(*e*) Did the arrangements for Press Advising work satisfactorily?

(*f*) If not, in what way could they be improved?

26. Effects of Raid on the A. R. P. Services, Civic Guards, Police, etc.—

(*a*) Resignations or desertions.

(*b*) New recruitment.

M.I. **27. Crime during and after Raid—especially looting.*—**

* *N.B.*—After the immediate report has been submitted this will be treated as a Civil Item.

M.I. **28. Fifth Column Activities and especially those of the terrorist groups.*—**

* *N.B.*—After the immediate report has been submitted this will be treated as a Civil Item.

29. Working of Civic Guards, Police and Police arrangements.

30. Damage caused.—

(i) General survey.

(ii) Particulars of serious damage to important buildings; munitions factories; docks, ships, railways and rolling stock, bridges and industrial concerns. (See also questions 28—33.)

(iii) Effect of damage on production of war material.

(iv) When is full production expected to be restored?

31. Communications.—

M.I. (*a*) *Effect of Raid on communications—*

M.I. (i) *Roads.*

M.I. (ii) *Railways.*

M.I. (iii) *Telephones.*

M.I. (iv) *Telegraphs.*

M.I. (v) *Posts.*

M.I. (vi) *Ports and Shipping.*

M.I. (vii) *Civil Aviation.*

32. Working of Telephone System During Raid.—

(*a*) Did it receive and transmit the Warning efficiently?

(*b*) Apart from interruption due to destruction of plant by bombs, did it function satisfactorily?

(*c*) If not, in what respects did it fail?

(*d*) Did the staffs at the Exchanges stick to their posts?

(*e*) Were the wires congested with messages?

(*f*) What damage was done by bombs?

(*g*) Any other points.

(*h*) Suggestions.

33. Water Supply.—

(1) Drinking Water.

(*a*) Was this affected?

(*b*) Was there an alternative system and did this work satisfactorily?

(*c*) Suggestions.

(2) *Unfiltered Water Supply.*

(*a*) Was this affected?

(*b*) What was the result

(*c*) Suggestions.

34. Coal Gas.—

(*a*) Was any damage caused to the gas supply arrangements?

(*b*) If so, were the results serious?

(*c*) Suggestions.

35. Electricity.—

(*a*) Was any damage caused to the Electric supply arrangements?

(*b*) If so, was the result serious?

(*c*) Suggestions.

36. Conservancy and Sanitation.—

(*a*) Did this continue to function?

(*b*) If not, what was the result?

(*c*) Suggestions.

37. Epidemics.—

M.I.—(*a*) *Did any epidemics break out?**

(*b*) If so, what steps were taken to check them?

(*c*) Suggestions.

**N.B.*—After the immediate report this will be treated as a Civil Item.

38. Shelters and Slit Trenches.

(*a*) Extent to which used by public?

(*b*) Extent to which they afforded protection?

(*c*) Number of people killed and wounded inside buildings?

(*d*) Number of people killed and wounded in streets and open places?

(*e*) Suggestions.

39. Animals.—

(*a*) Any instances of obstruction to A. R. P. vehicles or of danger to public from animals, cows, buffaloes, goats, dogs—not under control.

(*b*) Zoos.

(*c*) Suggestions.

40. Maintenance of Food Supplies.

41. Effects of Raid on Prices and Markets.

42. Working of Civil Defence Information Bureaus.

43. Were the General Preparations made inadequate in any respect?

44. Liaison and Co-operation between Civil and Military Authorities.

(Including the extent to which Military were compelled to assist in Civil Defence measures and the extent to which they had to ask for assistance from the Civil Authorities.)

45. Emergency Administration.—

(*a*) Was any use made by District Magistrates, etc., of the Special Emergency powers under the Defence of India Rules which they have been vested?

(*b*) Are any extra powers needed?

46. Public Opinion.—

Attitude of—

(*a*) The Press.

(*b*) Political Parties.

(*c*) The Legislatures.

(*d*) Public Opinion generally to the Raids, to the Civil Defence Measures and to Military Defence Measures.

Copy of letter No.3(15)-42/M dated the 14th March 1942 from the Secretary to the Hon'ble the Resident in Mysore.

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Collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects.

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I am directed to forward herewith a copy of a letter from the Govt. of India, Civil Defence Department, No.330/41-A.R.P.(3), dated the 19th February 1942 together with a copy of their letter No.330/41-A.R.P., dated the 31st December 1941 referred to therein. Copies of Training and Operations Circular No.11 referred to in paragraph 2 of the Government of India's letter dated the 19th February 1942 have already been forwarded to you.

2. The Govt. of India will be grateful if the Govt. of Mysore will kindly co-operate in the scheme drawn up by the Govt. of India for the collection of information in regard to hostile attacks and their effects.

3. The intention is that the Immediate and Preliminary reports referred to in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Govt. of India's letter dated the 19th February 1942 should be sent by this Residency by code telegram, while the fuller report should follow by express letter as soon as the situation has been properly appreciated. On receipt of information from the Govt. of Mysore, the required reports will be drawn up by this Residency in consultation with local Military authorities.

4. 24 spare copies of the questionnaire referred to in para 5 of the Govt. of India's letter are enclosed for the use of the State officers.

5. I am to request that if there is no objection, the consent of the Govt. of Mysore to co-operate fully in the scheme may kindly be communicated to this Residency as soon as possible.

Copy of letter from the Govt. of India, Civil Defence Dept. to all Provincial Govts., and Chief Commissioners, No.500/41-A.R.P. (TP), dated the 19th February 1942.

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I am directed to address you on the subject of reporting information regarding hostile attacks and their effects.

2. (i) The previous communications on this subject issued from this Dept. are letter No.500/41-A.R.P. of 31st December 1941, and Training and Operations Circular No.11, forwarded with letter No. 78/242/41-A.R.P.II dated the 8th January 1942.

(ii) The former letter still stands as regards its general purport viz., that immediate telegraphic information should be sent of any incidents which are likely to become the subject of false and exaggerated reports but, as regards the details of information specially required paragraph 2 is amplified and superseded by the present letter.

(iii) Section A of Training & Operations Circular No.11 (Local reports for action or information within the Civil Division or District) still stands but Section B (External reports to the Provincial Govt. and the Govt. of India) is superseded by the present letter.

3. (i) In order to lessen the ~~con~~ congestion of the communications and the burden on Provincial Govts./etc. and on Military authorities it has been decided that the calling for and collecting of information regarding enemy action will be centralised in the Defence Dept. as regards military information, and in the Civil Defence Dept. as regards civil information and that these two Dept... will pass on to all other Depts. and Provincial Govts./etc. such of the information as concerns them.

(ii) The only exception to this will be in the case of reports of working breakdown or of damage requiring instant departmental action such as interruption of communications e.g. Posts, Telegraphs, Railway, Ports and Civil Aviation. In these cases, reports strictly confined to the actual breakdown of working or to damage done and to the measures required to restore the situation may be submitted direct to the Director General, Post. and Telegraphs the Railway Board or the Communications Dept. as the case may be. No publicity will be given to such information without reference to the same Dept.

(iii) Nothing in the above restricts direct correspondence between any Dept. of the Govt. of India and Provincial Govts./Et. as regards departmental action arising as a result of enemy action.

4.(i) The Civil Defence Dept. will receive reports only from ~~Provincial~~ Govts./etc. and not from any local officers direct.

(ii) It would be preferable to send in information on vari items more or less as it comes in rather than to attempt to wait submit one comprehensive report. To control this it would probab be necessary to direct that when an incomplete report is sent in a paragraph should be added that a report on the remaining points (t be specified) will be submittedas soon as the information is avail-able.-

Reports should be drawn up in the form of answers to each section and sub-section of the Questionnaire using narrative form where necessary but avoiding a continuous narrative embracing a number of sections and sub-sections of the Questionnaire.

(iii) It is thought that to do this will not only assist officers in drawing up a clear report on the points required but will greatly assist Provincial Govts./etc. and Administrations as well as the Govt. of India not only in making sure that all the required information is in but also in collating subsequent reports with reports previously received. It might prove most convenient in the end to cut up the reports as they come in and to paste the answer to each sub-section on a sheet of paper and to paste below this any answers to the same sub-section received in subsequent reports. If this system was adopted it would be necessary to ask for reports to be written on one side of the page only.

(iv) Attached as Annexure II are copies of the four marginally noted letters issued by the Govt of Bengal which illustrate well what is suggested in sub-paragraph (i) and in paragraph 4 above and may be of assistance to other Provincial Govts./etc. and Administrations.

74(2)-P.D. dated 16.1.42, 75(24)-P.D. dated 16.1.42, 76(4).P.D. dated 16.1.42, 77 P.D. dated 16.1.42.

7. (i) It is requested that information will be submitted on the following lines:-

of t.	Military items.	Civil items.
ediate eports.	(1) By Military, if there is a Military Commander, to General Headquarters.- (2) Otherwise by Civil Govt. in a safe cypher to Civil Defence Dept., repeated to Defence Dept.	(1) By Military, if there is a Military Commander to General Headquarters. (2) Otherwise by Civil Govt. in a safe cypher to Civil Defence Dept.
sequent rts.	By Military on Military items to General Headquarters.	By Civil Govt. in consultation with Military Commander, if any to Civil Defence Dept. who will

(ii) Where there is a local Military Commander, [illegible] should be drawn up by the Provincial Govt./etc. in consultation with him.

(iii) The local Military Commander will be responsible for seeing that the concurrence of any Naval or Air Force Authorities within his jurisdiction is obtained and Provincial Govts./etc. need not concern themselves/etc. on this point.

5. Attached as Annexure I is a questionnaire showing the subjects on which information is desired and it is requested that any suggestions as to the inclusion of any further sections or questions should be sent as soon as possible.

The questionnaire may appear formidable at first sight but the Govt. of India feel sure that Provincial Govts./etc. will agree that it is necessary that information as detailed as this should be collected for the following reasons:-

(a) The local Executive Officers will need to have ready information on all these points in order to carry on [illegible] administration and so as to mould their future policy and [illegible] stration.

(b) Provincial Govts./etc. will need it for the same reasons and also in order to enable them/etc. to issue Communiques, control publicity and compile a full and accurate history of Air Raids within their/etc. jurisdiction which will be of very great importance.

(c) The Govt. of India need it for the same reasons and also in order that they may be able to pass on to other Provinces and Administrations and to the Indian States information and advice based on experience gained in areas that have been attacked. The Govt. of India are, therefore, confident that they can count on the fullest co-operation in the supply of information desired.

6. (i) The Govt. of India suggest that, if it has not already been done, Provincial Govts./etc. should at once set up the necessary machinery in order to ensure that answers to the various questions would be submitted at the earliest possible moment.

The machinery would consist in framing out sections of the Questionnaire to the various executive officers concerned, Services and to public utilities and local [illegible] with directions that answers to the questions [illegible] information is required should be regarded as [illegible] importance and one to be fulfilled at the [illegible] while answers to other questions to which an [illegible] at once should be submitted within a number of hours after [illegible]

(ii) It will be noticed that immediate reports on both civil and military items are to be submitted by the Military Commander where there is one but that after this the Military will not report on civil items although they are to be shown the civil report before it is sent to Civil Defence Dept.

The portions of the Questionnaire which are Military items are underlined and all these are also immediate and have been marked M.I. in the margin. It will, therefore, be the concern of Provincial Govts./etc. to give the Military all information they/etc. collect on these subjects in order that a full report may reach the Govt. of India. It will be particularly appreciated that it is more than ever necessary that information on Military Immediate subjects should be sent in to Provincial Govts./etc. without delay by civil officers in areas where there are no Military.

8. (i) The Govt. of India would be obliged if the following reports could reach it:-

1. Immediate Report (by code telegram or wireless or secret telephone, if possible.)
2. Preliminary Report to be sent as soon after hostile action as possible.
3. A fuller report (to be known as the second report) drawn up on the same lines as the preliminary report but containing more detailed information to be sent within 24 hours.
4. After the second report a daily report until the situation returns to normal.

(ii) If there is a breakdown or great congestion of communications, it may be necessary for Provincial Govts./etc. to send reports by special couriers.

9. Provincial Govts./etc. are requested to state how many spare copies, if any, they/etc. require of - (1) This letter,
(2) Annexure I, &
(3) Annexure II.

Letter from the Govt. of India, Civil Defence Dept., to all Provincial Govts. and Chief Commissioners, No.390/41-A.R.P. dated the 31st December 1941.

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The Provincial Govts. have been addressed by the Govt. of India, in the Dept. of Information and Broadcasting letter No.335/41 of the 24th December 1941, regarding the necessity of their taking all possible action to contradict or prevent the spread of rumours and unconfirmed reports.

Though Provincial Govts. are responsible for taking the initiative where this is possible, it is essential that the Govt. of India should also be in a position to contradict any false

reports which may gain currency in regard to enemy action, or the likelihood of enemy action against India.

Further the Govt. of India need for general purposes of liaison to be fully in touch with what is going on.

I am, therefore, to request that the Provincial Govt./you will send immediate telegraphic information of any incidents which are likely to become the subject of false and exaggerated reports.

2. The matters on which information is specially required are-

(a) Appearance of hostile aircraft or surface craft;
(b) Raids of any description, number of casualties and extent of damage;
(c) Any large movement of population away from threatened areas;
(d) Any other matters affecting public morale.

The Provincial Govt./you may be able to make additions to this list, either now or as the situation develops.

The reports should be sent to Civil Defence Dept.

Copy of a Memorandum No.75(24)P.D., dated the 16th January 1942 to all Dist. Officers, Except 24-Parganas, Howrah, Hooghly.

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The undersigned is directed to state that the question of reporting to Govt. in the event of an air raid taking place in any part of Bengal has been under consideration and it has been decide that the following action should be taken at such a time.

2. As soon after an air raid as possible, an express code telegram (to be known as the first telegram) is to be despatched to the Chief Secretary reporting that an air raid has taken place and indicating the places raided and giving as far as possible some indicating of the scale of attack, damage done to both personnal and material, state of morale and whether assistance is required, and, if so, what.

3. It is clearly to be understood that Govt. require the very earliest intimating of an air raid taking place in your jurisdiction. If, therefore, it is not possible for you, when sending off the first telegram, to give details without delaying its despatch, the telegram should not be postponed on that account.

4. As soon as possible after a telegram has been despatched, a report (to be known as the preliminary report) should be sent by express letter and also by telephone, if a telephone is available giving details of the raid and amplifying, as far as possible, the

necessarily meagre information contained in the 1st telegram. The report will be sent in the prescribed form, copy enclosed (not reproduced. It was a short questionnaire on the lines of Annexure D which will not be deviated from. When drawing up your report, you will naturally obtain as much information as is readily available from all officers subordinate to you - police, A.R.P. authorites (if such are in existence), civil defence organisations as well as from municipalities, railways and other organisations but the report must not be delayed on this account.

5. After the issue of the preliminary report, a fuller report (to be known as the second report) should be sent within 24 hours. This report should be drawn up on the same lines as the preliminary report but is expected to contain more detailed information than was possible when the preliminary report was written.

6. After the second report a daily report should be sent until the situation returns to normal.

7. If there is a military detachment in your district, both the first wire as well as the preliminary, second and daily reports should be sent in consultation with the military authorities. Copies of all reports and telegrams should be sent to your Divisional Commissioner.

8. Communiques to the press will only be issued by Chief Secy. from Calcutta through the Publicity Dept. H No information, therefore, is to be given to the local press by you until a communique has been issued in Calcutta. After a communique has been issued (it will be wired to you, if possible, immediately on issue), you may at your discretion allow statements regarding the raid to appear in the local papers. It is to be clearly understood however, that censorship is to be rigorously enforced whenever necessary and no statements are to appear without your knowledge and without your authority. When examining statements proposed to be issued in the press, attention should be paid to the necessity for raising public morale, avoiding any suggestion of panic and ensuring that examples or heroism and steadiness are given prominence.

Copy of a letter No.76(4)P.D., dated the 15th January 1942 to the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta and Dist. Magistrates of 24-Parganas, Howrah and Hooghly.

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The undersigned is directed to state that the question of reporting to Govt. in the event of an air-raid taking place in a part of your district (in Calcutta) has been under consideration and it has been decided that the following action should be taken at such a time.

( ) for Commissioner of Police.

2. During an air raid the Chief Civil Defence Commissioner/ he Director, Civil Defence will have to be kept informed periodically of the general situation. Information will be supplied over he 'phone, if possible, and if not, by messenger. The information iven during such periodical appreciations cannot be of a set haracter but must depend on circumstances.

3. As soon after an air xxx raid as possible, a report (to be nown as the preliminary report) should be sent by telephone, if ossible and if not, by a messenger giving details of the raid so ar as they are known at that time.

4. The report will be sent in the prescribed form, copy enclos not reproduced, it was a short questionnaire on the lines of nnexure I) which will not be deviated from. When drawing up our report, you will naturally obtain information from all offiers subordinate to you - police, A.R.P. authorities and civil efence organisations. Reports will not be received or asked for y you from railways and Port Commissioners as those organisations ill report to the Chief Civil Defence Commissioner/the Director, ivil Defence, direct. If the preliminary report is sent over the phone, it will be subsequently confirmed by a written report. This eport is not to be delayed and must be furnished even if exact letails are not available.

5. After the issue of the preliminary report, a fuller report to be known as the second report, should be sent within 24 hours. his report should be drawn up on the same lines as the preliminary eport, but it is expected to contain more detailed information tha ossible when the preliminary report was written.

6. After the second report, a daily report should be sent unti the situation returns to normal.

(Copies of all reports should be sent to your Divisional Commissioner).

( ) for Dist. Magistrates only.

7. Communiques or statements to the press will only be issued by the Chief Secy. from Calcutta through the Publicity Dept. No information, therefore, is to be given to the local press by you until a communique has been issued in Calcutta. After a communique has been issued, you may, at your discretion, allow statements regarding the raid to appear in the local news, are that are published in your district. It is to be clearly understood, however, that censorship is to be rigorously enforced whenever necessary. No statements are to appear without your knowledge and without your authority. When examining statements proposed t be issued in your local newspapers, attention should be paid to the necessity for raising public morale, avoiding any suggestion panic and ensuring that examples of heroism and steadiness are

ndnance.

( ) for Dist. Magistrates only.

nnorship and the scrutiny of all statements proposed to be made the press in Calcutta will be carried out by the Special Press iser.)

( ) for Commissionar of Police only.